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ABSTRACT
Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, and with its
evolution since then, the skyscraper has presented well-documented chal-
lenges to developers, architects, and policy makers. This study rein-
vestigates these challenges by taking a hard look at the controversies
skyscrapers have occasioned. The reasoning behind this methodology is
that conflicts like these can tell as much about broader issues as they
can about the subject at hand. Accordingly, skyscraper debates in four
American cities are probed: Boston, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and San
Francisco.
Among the findings are these: First, the skyscraper,by virtue of
new problems it presented, effected changes in the legal constructs of
American planning law. Second, the conflicts that emerged revolved
around deeply felt values concerning economics, health, safety, aethetics,
and the quality of life. Third, that the challenges skyscrapers present-
ed necessitated a clearer understanding of how cities function and grow.
And, fourth, the skyscraper magnified the differences between various
people's goals, and so became an impetus for early development
restrictions.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Gary A. Hack
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Design
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INTRODUCTION
The skyscraper is America's most recognizable architectural achieve-
ment, and though its silhouette can be seen worldwide, its strongest
associations are still with this country. It has also been the focus of
ongoing conflict since its inception in the late nineteenth century. As
with much in history, to understand such conflicts is to understand the
milieu within which they occurred. It is with this in mind that this
study explores the conflicts the skyscraper has provoked. In the end,
this should reveal, first, much about the skyscraper and, second, much
about city building.
Briefly, why was the skyscraper developed? The most widely recog-
nized reason is that it satisfied the needs of business, and indeed
this is a recurring theme throughout skyscraper debates. Its develop-
ment coincided with and acted as a catalyst for corporate expansion
I
during the late nineteenth century. Though it was unique, its role was
not. As Lewis Mumford has noted, its development and that of other
machines--e.g., the typewriter and the telephone--moved forward rapidly
because they could bolster corporate profit making. In short, the sky-
scraper satisfied the headquartering needs of growing corporations,
especially in terms of coordinating the functions of production, dis-
tribution, and financing. Towards this end, it also became a symbol of
orporate power: its form and location (in urban centers) helped instill
confidence in corporations. This was crucial if those corporations were
to continue to grow.
Still, these purposes do not suggest why skyscrapers should be so
controversial. The reasons have to do with divergent goals within
society, particularly with regard to problems of economics, aesthetics,
health and safety, and quality of life. This study look; at these concerns
and provides insights into the following questions:
Skyscraper debates forced people to be explicit about those
things they value about cities. Simply, what are they and
why are they valued?
Skyscrapers were the subject of early controls on development.
What issues of balancing public and private needs through
standard setting did they raise?
The skyscraper and the debates it spawned were a barometer2
of people's understanding of city form. How has that under-
standing developed and matured?
Given the problems associated with skyscrapers, why do they
continue to be built and why have controversies persisted?
These issues are explored by looking at debates that have trans-
pired in Boston, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco. Each
city is important for its own reasons. Boston, which is looked at near
the turn of this century, was one of the first U.S. cities to promulgate
height restrictions. Court cases challenging these influenced legal
constructs of property rights and so set the stage for future property
controls. Chicago, the birthplace of the skyscraper, epitomized the
conditions for capitalist expansion mentioned previously. The Chicago
debate shortly followed that in Boston and was, significantly, the most
comprehensive of that era. As for Washington, its symbolic importance
as the Capital places unique demands on its architecture: federal
buildings and monuments are to dominate all others. Its debates are
enlightening because they pit local and national needs against each
other. Both early and recent debates are considered in this case.
Finally, San Francisco has experienced an intense, ongoing debate for
the last fifteen years. It has been the most heated in recent U.S.
history and has raised a potpourri of skyscraper issues including many3
never raised earlier.
The study also presents aspects of history thathelp explain the
e volution of the skyscraper and help frame the debates. The earlier
cases are aided by a chapter on technology and social conditions during
the late 1800s. In addition, the early and recent cases are bridged by
an overview of those theories of the modern movement which have had
especial influence on modern skyscrapers and their uses.
Finally, it must be said that skyscrapers have been discussed and
written about countless times. Still, it is my hope that by focusing on
skyscraper debates, new insights into their form and that of American
cities will emerge.
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Nations and civilizations will rise and fall and historians of
the distant future may decree that we were not many of the things
we now think we are, but certainly they will say of us that we
were a nation of builders, the greatest the world had known until
then. They will say it if we never build another structure, if
we never draw another design. We have created a great new
ref. 41, p. 6 architecture that has taken its place with the classics.
TECHNOLOGICAL
ACHIEVEMENTS..............
5
The skyscraper was but one of many technological achievements during
what Lewis Mumford has called the "Brown Decades," those years between
1865 and 1895. The telephone, electric light, gas engine, and typewriter
are among the others which, if not invented then, at least became fully
developed during those years.30 Their inception, and that of machines
in general, moved apace because of demands placed on market economies to
increase the production and distribution of goods, two of the driving
forces of the industrial revolution.3 1
Certain technological improvements of that era were important in
the development of the skyscraper; especially the improved elevator, the
Bessemer steel process, and the invention of the structural steel frame.
Before elevator mechanics were improved, buildings were built no higher
than six or so stories because of the limits of human strength for
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climbing stairs. Moreover, the ability to build higher existed, but the
incentive did not since rents tended to drop off above the third story.
Freight elevators were used in Boston and New York before 1850, but they
were very slow. Also slow was the first passenger elevator, installed
in a New York store in 1857 by ElishaOtis.9 In time, however, further
improvements--like the suspended elevator and the hydraulic piston ele-
vator--enhanced the elevator's use and made taller buildings increasing-
ly practical.4 1
The Bessemer process, invented in 1856, encouraged the iron industry
to move from cast and wrought iron production to increased steel produc-
2
tion. The use of cast iron in buildings dates back at least to 1780
when it was used to replace wood posts in English cotton mills. 9
Paxton's Crystal Palace (1851) is probably the best known example of a
totally iron-structured building. As for the Bessemer process, it was
discovered by accident when Bessemer used an iron with a low phosphorous
content in an experiment to decarbonize the iron. The process allowed
steel to be produced more cheaply than wrought or cast iron. Steel's
major early use was for armaments and the transport of armies.36
Mumford claims that when wars ended, like the American Civil War,
the armaments industry (i.e., steel industry) needed new markets for its6
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fig. 3,4: Chicago, Fair
Store, W.L.B. Jenney,
detail and framing
ref. 4, p. 198
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technologies. The building industry, along with the structural steel
frame, became one such market.31 In the 1880s, a Minneapolis architect,
Leroy Buffington, claimed authorship for an idea to support masonry
building envelopes on steel shelves hung from steel frames.13 Others,
however, claim he pirated the idea from William Le Baron Jenney's Home
Insurance Building (Chicago, 1885). Daniel Burnham said that Jenney, a
Chicago architect, deserves credit for the system and, hence, the sky-
scraper. Jenney's Fair Store was the first structure built using the
system entirely (Chicago, 1893).16 Regardless of authorship, the system
was important. It freed ground levels from the thick structural supports
required of masonry systems, allowed larger windows for views from of-
fices and into store display windows, and shortened construction times.
The skyscraper satisfied the needs of American businesses which,
because of improved production and distribution capabilities, were ex-
panding rapidly. Early skyscrapers were usually office buildings with a
floor or two of mercantile uses at ground level and layer upon layer of
identical office floors above: "a system of cells--hundreds of similar
rooms side by side and superimposed, equally desirable (so far as pos-
sible), and equally well lighted." One of their most important objectives
was to satisfy the home office requirements of national and inter-
t*-IGINAL 'P, OF' THE HOME INWILANCE BUILINGiP-
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fig. 5: Chicago, Home Insurance
Bui Zding, W. L. B. Jenney
fig. 6: New York,
Singer Building,
Ernest Flagg
fig. 7 (top), 8 (bot.):
New York, Woolworth
Building, Cass Gilbert
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national corporations.13 They, along with other technological improve-
ments (especially the telephone), allowed emerging corporations to run
dispersed plants from a single location, usually the financial center of
a larger city. Densities in these areas increased as more skyscrapers
were erected, and together they provided opportunities for the face-to-
face meetings necessary for securing new national and international
markets. In addition, skyscrapers were a symbol of prestige and power
for corporations and provided advertising for them. Cass Gilbert's
Woolworth Building (New York, 1913) and Ernest Flagg's Singer Building
(New York, 1913) are early examples.
SEEDS OF EARLY
CRITICISMS................
10
Skyscrapers also raised numerous fears. Some of the earliest ones
were about issues of health, a problem brought to the public's attention
by conditions in working-class housing districts and by inroads made in
the field of health during that time.
The industrial revolution had brought rapid urbanization to nine-
teenth-century industrial cities. New technologies and machines had
created jobs which enticed people to move to New York, Philadelphia,
Chicago, and other large cities. A problem that arose was that poorer,
working-class citizens were often housed in crowded and unsanitary
conditions. But at the same time, discoveries in the field of health
were being made. By the mid-1860s, Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister were
establishing relationships between poor sanitary condition, germs, and
communicable diseases. Too, the curative powers of the sun were be-
coming known. It was found, for example, that sunlight helped prevent
rickets and cure tuberculosis, could sanitize water, and could reduce
the number of pathogenic bacteria in the environment. Additionally, it
was clear that dark, damp places--mines, slum housing, factories--were
breeding grounds for bacteria.3 1 Accordingly, an early, recurring fear
of skyscrapers was that they would change once sunny streets into places
like these, and in doing so provide opportunities for the spread of dis-
ease.
As for the housing conditions themselves, New York's, by no means
unique, offer some insights. By 1865, the city found itself, because of
industrialization and immigration, with a working-class population of
500,000. They were packed into tenement housing covering no more than
two square miles and usually surrounded by the worst of health conditions.
Illnesses were expected and common and often simply labeled "tenant-
house rot;" tenements themselves were called "fever nests."
4 0
Such conditions stirred social reformers in New York into action.11
ref. 40, p. 66
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In the early 1860s, one such group embarked on a study of tenement hous-
ing sanitation, dividing such areas into twenty-nine districts. Each
was assigned an investigator (usually a doctor), responsible for making
house-to-house visitations, mapping the occurrence of disease, and des-
cribing the district's physical attributes. The study exposed terrible
living conditions which were said to affect the physical, mental, and
moral well-being of tenement inhabitants.40 One investigator, writing
about street filth, said
As a rule, the streets are extremely dirty and offensive, and
the gutters obstructed with filth. The filth of the streets
is composed of house-slops, refuse vegetables, decayed fruit,
store and shop sweepings, ashes, dead animals, and even human
excrements. These putrifying organic substances are ground
together by the constantly passing vehicles. When dried by
the summer's heat, they are driven by the wind in every direc-
tion in the form of dust. When remaining moist or liquid in the
form of "slush," they emit deleterious and very offensive
exhalations.
Compounding the health problem with their stench and wastes were
the numerous slaughter houses found within these areas. Christopher
Tunnard has said that it was not until the 1890s that cattle, sheep, and
pigs were cleared from some city streets.4 6 Equally problematic were
privies and cesspools; overflowing sewage and a shortage of facilities
were common. One investigator found a privie with four seats (open to
t t
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each other) for a building with one hundred tenants. Such conditions
40
were not at all rare.
Revelations like these led to numerous housing reforms including
health laws and development of the dumbbell tenement. However, reform
efforts did not immediately eliminate the problems. For instance, in
1892, because conditions were still bad, Congress funded a study to look
at tenement-housing in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Baltimore.
And in the early 1890s, the New York state legislature authorized ap-
pointment of the Tenement House Committee. They produced a 600 page
report which in the end blamed congestion (over-crowding) for many of the
problems in tenement housing districts. Interestingly, the issue of con-
gestion became an important impetus for the first national conference on
city planning.37 It was also a concern associated with skyscrapers.
In general, reform movements like those mentioned above were led by
the well-to-do, supposedly on behalf of those less fortunate. Mel Scott
has written that there was nothing novel about such efforts; they were
simply an extension of a broad, growing concern for the public welfare
37
that had been in place for thirty or forty years. Others have taken
a more critical view. Engels, writing in The Housing Question, said that
those who were better off (the bourgeoisie) became philanthropic when
SANITARY AND TOPOCRAPHICAL MAP OF THE TWENTIETH DISTRICT.
----------- ---- GIIPL EAI rr attw i- m -l.... ...  ------------  -~
------.- 
--37 ---- 4-- ------------- ------------------------------
1- * - e s-
9S. P C S
- --.. -............ - - --- - ~-- - .302 --.......... ..- - - ---- 
CC
- C .R
i~;........00...__ 34.............
------. Bewers essucted prior to 1649. -- eston of fever-nests In 1864 * SquareS now wholly or partially occupkd
---- Sewers constuedoil sinc-e that periodi. C T-Cholera infimtom. cowodedl tenemfenit.
Figures on the 8th nad 10th Aenues, at the inter~ection of the streets. Indieate the original elevations'i
13
WEST ORTIETH STREE T.
g C , 0 E --- ------
nuss- n T MA N UR E P
W EST TH IR TY N IN TH STRE E T.J--- A ME.L.T NG A.ND B O.N.E BTII, L .N. . .L.
P M l D E. p P STA L
L C
5; askan 5 ~,(<eas CAROL
W EST T H IRTY E IGCHT H ZST REE T,.
L--- VA.m~un.# 3 g
ME MANURE YA RD .A T10
^" W E ST THIRTY S E VENT H ST REET. - """" "'"
REPORT OF THE TWENTY-FUTH SANITAEY DISTRICT.
Prevailing Diseases in one square in 1864, prior to Oct. 1st.
[oomieles ia whieh ateknes oceurred re designated by lette.]
i. Two infants died of diphtheria.
b. An infant died in warm weather.
c. Two infants spoon-fed, died in warm weather,
twelve and fourteen days old.
d. An infant has had the bowel complaint during
the six weeks preceding Oct. lst.
a. An infant has been nick several weeks, and is
now much reduced, the mother says, "Iwith its
f. An infant died of cholera infantum in warm
weather.
g. A boy two years old had typhus fever in Sep-
temnber. An infant died in the summer.
A. An infant had bowel complaint in hot weather.
i. it 9'
j. A spoon-fed infant died of cholera infantum. A
girl about eight years old has typhus at pres-
ent (Oct. lSat).
k. Two children had dysentery.
L Two children had iniammation of eyes.
m. A child twenty-one months old had diarrhaea all
summer.
a. Two infants had cholera infanturn; one died.
One child has inflammation of eyes.
o. An infant one year old had cholera infantum.
p. An infant had cholera infantum In summer. A
girl had fever (probably typhus).
q. Two cases of dysentery, and three of cholera
infantum, in hot weather.
r. One case of cholera infantum.
a. An infant in the summer very sick with cholera
infantum. A girl eight years old now has
fever.
. An infant had cholera infantum.
Is. Severe attack of dysentery in an adult.
9. An infant died in warm weather with the bowel
complaint.
W. An infant died of cholera infantum.
z. An infant sick with diarrhoa In summer, reow-
15
TENTH AVENUE
,", AV~s. MRE
FR.R.RSTABL.ESI
REGION Of BONE-BOILING AND SWILL-MILK NUISANCES,
14
fig. 13,
tenement
14, 15: New York,
housing districts
1866,
ref. 31, p. 195
16
they realized that the epidemics of the poor could be transmitted to
them.19 Lewis Mumford has said something similar:
The rich feared the poor and the poor feared the rent
collector; the middle classes feared the plagues that came
from the vile unsanitary quarters of the industrial city;
and the poor feared, with justice, the dirty hospitals to
which they were taken.
Whether such fears were so clearly defined is debatable, but pre-
sumably there is some truth in them. Moreover, the social pathologies
of the poor were apparently instrumental in bounding early skyscraper
debates, especially when it came to issues of light and air and conges-
tion. There were, however, other early concerns. That fires--which had
had a long history of city destruction--would be especially destructive
in skyscrapers was one such recurring fear. Not surprisingly, economics
were also important. This is understandable given that skyscrapers
satisfied economic needs and that whose who advocated them (and some-
times those who opposed them) had economic motives underlying their
positions. Skyscrapers were also criticized for what they symbolized:
corporations struggling for power, money, and profits. Criticisms on
these grounds also held that tall buildings lacked the permanence and
spirit of more important architectural symbols, e.g., the church and
structures of government. These issues and others are discussed in
greater detail in the chapters that follow.
17
CHAPTER 2: BOSTON: STRUGGLING WITH GOVERNMENT TNTFRVFNTTON
EARLY RESTRICTIONS........
THE STATE HOUSE...........
18
In 1891, the Massachusetts state legislature established for Boston
a city-wide height limitation of 125 feet.8 Boston height standards
following this initial regulation resulted in a number of court cases
whose far-reaching decisions influenced in important ways the course of
American land use and planning law. Most notably, they affected the legal
construct of the police power. This chapter looks at these cases and
regulations and the hearings of the 1916 Commission on Building Heights.
Together they show a struggle to understand the proper role of public
intervention in private development and the effects such intervention
can have on real estate economics.
In 1899, the state legislature passed a 70-foot height restriction
on a tract of land downhill from the State House. This was done to pro-
tect the capitol's dominance on the skyline, a goal the state claimed
was a public benefit. In keeping with then contemporary notions of
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fig. 16: Boston, State House
Charles Bulfinch
_i' fig. 17: Boston, 1916,
Comonwealth Avenue
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fig. 18: Boston, Trinity
Church, H.H. Richardson
fig. 19: Boston, Boston
Public Library, McKim,
Mead and White
20
-a-
F
COPLEY SQUARE.............
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property rights, the law required compensation to landowners if a court
sound there was a taking of constitutionally guaranteed property rights
(see insert on the police power). In 1901, a landowner went to court to
challenge the law (Parker v. Commonwealth) and to collect damages. The
court found procedural problems with the law but substantiated the state's
claim that the public would benefit by maintaining the beauty of the
capitol. The court found this goal just as proper as protecting people
from loss by fire.
The court said it was legal "to save the dignity and beauty of the
city at its culminating point for the pride of every Bostonian and for
the pleasure of every member of the State." An important aspect of the
court's decision was that compensation was deemed necessary, implying
1) that a taking had occurred and 2) that the law did not fall under
the police power. If it had, compensation would not have been required.4 9
The Copley Square restrictions were enacted in 1898 by the state
legislature to control traffic and pedestrian congestion and meet
aesthetic ends. The square's character was already firmly established by
two beautiful and dignified buildings bordering it: on the west side
was the Boston Public Library by McKim, Mead, and White (1888-1895) and
to the east was Trinity Church by H.H. Richardson (1872-1877). To the
THE EXPANDING POLICE POWER
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution states that any taking of proper-
ty rights by government must be founded on
some public use and must include compensa-
tion to the property owner from whom the
rights are taken. The legal construct em-
bodied in this process is that of eminent
domain. It was the guiding philosophy
for most matters of public control of pro-
perty until the late nineteenth century.
It gave property owners some assurance in
property ownership.
Changes occurred near the turn of the
century as land use laws were increasingly
based on police power, a power vested with
each state through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The important distinction to be made
between it and eminent domain is that the
former does not require compensation as
long as the property owner has been treated
with "due process." This was an important
change that struck at the sanctity of pro-
perty ownership. It is upon the police
power which most American land use and
planning law now rests. Briefly, the
police power is constitutional as long as
property restrictions do not constitute
a taking. In general, this means that the
law must promote public health, safety,
and general welfare, must not be arbi-
trary or capricious, and must be reason-
able. 49
22
ref. 49, vol. 3, p. 157
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north were, as there are now, smaller parcels of scattered ownership.4 9
The character of the square was further enhanced when the Copley Plaza
Hotel was built on the south side. Designed by Henry J. Hardenberg and
Clarence H. Blackall (1912), it fell under the guidelines of the 1898
height restrictions: 100 feet along Boylston Street and 90 feet along
the other three sides. 4 9
Like the State House restriction, this statute allowed for compensa-
tion and was taken to court, this time in the case of Williams v. Parker
(1899). The case, said to be the first on modern zoning, was over whether
a 10-story, 120-foot tall building could be built on the corner of St.
James and Trinity Place, a site falling under the restrictions. The law
was upheld in the Massachusetts Supreme Court as a legal use of eminent
domain. But the court also said that the law could have been written
using only the police power, and that this power could be used to aid
the safety, comfort, convenience, and benefit of property owners generally.
The court said
It would be hard to say that this statute might not have
been passed in the exercise of the police power, as other
such statutes regulating the erection of buildings in
cities are commonly passed.
Regardless, since the statute required compensation--that is, since
1904 HEIGHT LIMITATIONS...
ref. 20, p. 51
24
eminent domain was used--the court had to find that some public use was
satisfied by it. They found one: by restricting heights, more light
and air would enter the square, and people within it could see over
buildings more easily. According to Norman Williams, Jr., most American
zoning proceeded directly from this statement. Simply, it implied that
public control of private land did not necessarily require compensation.4 9
In 1904, a commission was established to recommend new citywide
height restrictions to supersede those in affect since 1891. The outcome
was a division of the city into two districts--district A and district B.
District A had a limitation of 125 feet, was only downtown, and was
commercial in character. District B was residential and had a limitation
of eighty feet except on streets more than sixty-four feet wide. In this
case the limit was one and one-quarter times the width of the street to
a maximum height of one hundred feet. Additionally, the State House and
Copley Square limitations were kept.4 9
The districting was significant: it was the first time an American
city had different regulations for different districts. That is, it was
the first time a city had been "zoned." According to Elizabeth Herlihy,
this law was the "cornerstone upon which rests the principle of zoning
for height throughout the country."
ref. 49, vol. 3, p. 159
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Regardless, the 1904 limitations did not sit well with everyone.
The most important instance ended up in court and involved a proposed
125-foot building in a residential district facing the Boston Public
Garden. The case, Welch v. Swasey, went to the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in 1907 and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909.49 Two critical ques-
tions were tested. First, can building heights be limited as an exercise
of the police power? Second, under the same power, can areas of a city
be differentiated by prescribing different height limitations for each
area?20
The courts apparently thought so and upheld the law as constitution-
al on both counts. The Massachusetts court's opinion noted that tall
buildings on narrow streets can affect public health. The court's
opinion states
The erection of very high buildings in cities, especially upon
narrow streets, may be carried so far as materially to exclude
sunshine, light and air, and thus to affect the public health.
It may also increase the danger to persons and property from
fire, and be a subject for legislation on that ground. These
are proper subjects for consideration in determining whether,
in a given case, rights of property in the use of land should
be interfered with for the public good.
The court also said that higher land values and greater demand for space
downtown were sound rationale for allowing taller buildings. The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed with these points, adding that delimiting areas of
the city was a proper use of the police power.4 9
Still, the courts' approval did little to quash opposition to the
law. Following are reactions to the 1904 law as revealed in 1916 at
hearings held by the Commission on Height of Buildings. The hearings
were a litmus of then contemporary attitudes about city building and the
role of the government in intervening in private property. They reveal
a struggle to understand the workings of real estate markets, strategies
to maximize investment returns on property, and the effects city policy
can have on each of these. Thus, under a seemingly simple matter--
building height regulations--lay a rich sampling of important issues.
THE 1916 HEARINGS.........
26
The purpose of the 1916 hearings was to determine if district A's
boundaries should be extended. Participants came with pro and con views
about equally represented, though some participants represented very
powerful interest groups, most notably the Massachusetts Real Estate
Exchange (MREE) and the Boston Real Estate Exchange (BREE). Members of
these groups generally wanted to see the boundaries relaxed or removed
entirely. The strongest advocate for maintaining the boundaries was
Nathan Matthews, an attorney who had chaired the commission that
HEALTH AND SAFETY.........
ref. 8, p. 22
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established the 1904 regulation.
The arguments embedded within the minutes of the 1916 hearings
were about health and safety, economics, and aesthetics.
Debates about public health and safety were similar to those in
other cities at the time, though less emphasis was placed on them here.
The reason is that the Boston hearings were dominated by real estate and
business interests. If more people with public health backgrounds had
participated, health and safety concerns would have been represented more
strongly.
For one, it was clear that light and air were considered important
to people's well-being. A trustee of the Boston Public Library, Colonel
Benton, created an image of buildings inching up in self-defense against
neighboring tall buildings that "stole" light and air from the areas
around them.8 Nathan Matthews, in an effort to marshal support for main-
taining the boundaries, said
Would you, as public officers, condemn the poor people of this
city--the poorer people, those who have to work in offices, to
work in darkness... Gentlemen of the commission, this world was
created for light. That was the first purpose that was indi-
cated by the Creator when he made it.
Matthews, despite those pleas, claimed congestion was the worst
problem facing cities and that tall buildings were adding to the problem.
He asserted that if given his way in 1904 the law then would have held
all buildings to a 100-foot limit. That way business would have been
more evenly distributed throughout the city, congestion downtown would
have been dissipated, and everyone would have benefitted. He said the
125-foot limit was set because so many buildings in the area were already
that height; it was not set, as many thought, to distinguish between
commercial and residential uses. In other words, the "zoning" of the
city into areas of use was accidental. On the other side of the issue
was an architect who saw congestion not as a problem but rather a bene-
fit of centralization. He gave an example of a downtown shopper who,
with no trouble at all, could go to all of the major department stores
in the city. 8
Fire safety was also assumed to be affected by tall buildings. On
the side of keeping buildings low was a fire engineer, Mr. Gorham Dana,
who noted that the average fire loss in U.S. cities was $2.50 per capita
while in Europe it was $.20 to $.40. It was his opinion that 125 feet
was too tall for then contemporary fire-fighting equipment. On the
other hand, advocates for taller buildings claimed that building code
standards mandated "first-class" construction for such buildings,
whereas lower buildings could be "second-class." This raised the28
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question of whether it was better to have a city of tall first-class
buildings or one of lower second-class buildings. Insurance rates were
used to show that skyscrapers were not especially dangerous, and indi-
cated, in fact, that some high buildings were safer than many lower
8
ones.
Discussions on aesthetic issues did not consume much hearing time,
though interest was plainly revealed. One occasion for this was when
participants were considering changes to the Copley Square regulations.
One group that voiced their concern was the trustees of the Boston Public
Library. They argued for maintaining the existing height standards
in order to help preserve the architectural scale of the library. A
point was also made that the city now had a City Planning Board which
was concerned with the irregularity of building heights and the fact
that they hindered achievement of "the city beautiful."8 This was, of
course, a reference to the city beautiful movement, then in good currency.
Finally, Edward Warren spoke on the importance of aesthetics and other
related matters:
While, of course, individual injustice should always be
carefully considered, I think the interest of the whole city
at large is one we should never lose sight of. I think
questions of light and air, the beauty of the city, things
that will make it a better place for all, rich and poor
ref. 8, p. 128
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alike to live in, are questions we should have very much at
heart.
Given the make-up of the hearings' participants--mostly businessmen
with personal real estate holdings or clients with the same--it was not
surprising to find economic issues to be the salient ones. Five such
issues were revealed: economic height, real estate markets, property
values, equity, and flow of capital.
The economic height of a building is that height at which the return
on investment is highest. On the first day of the hearings, George
Washburn, president of MREE, commented that nearly all members of the
exchange wanted restrictions removed so that a decent return could be
made, even if it meant going higher than 125 feet. It was their opinion
that limitations were unnecessary because building heights would adjust
themselves naturally: investors would not build to a height with an un-
reasonable return. He pointed out that in New York (where there were
then no restrictions) the heights of buildings were determined in this
way. Moreover, height restrictions would have kept some buildings from
being built in New York, just as they had in Boston.8
Frederick Woodruff, a real estate broker, claimed that two or three
additional stories above the current limits would help raise building
real estate markets.......
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returns from two to four percent to six percent or more. He had run
pro formas to check this and had concluded that, under the present
limits, capitalists would be reluctant to invest their money in 80-foot,
90-foot, or even 100-foot buildings. Two hotels, the Copley Plaza and
the Brunswick, indicated that they thought building higher was more
profitable. A Copley representative said its stockholders had "a rather
hard road to hoe" under the present height restrictions. The hotel was
filled and needed more room, and going up to 125 feet would do the job
less expensively than acquiring and building on adjacent property. The
Brunswick representative said they wanted the right to go to 125 feet
though they would not do it until the character of the area was more
firmly established. 8
Nathan Matthews presented research findings to show that higher
buildings were uneconomic because of a lack of demand for tall buildings.
He pointed out that of the 342 estates in the Boylston Street district,
not a single owner had approached the Commission with a desire to build
higher. He argued also that going twenty-five feet higher would be
damaging to real estate as a whole, assuming that only a few property
owners built higher. His logic was that tall buildings stole light and
air from shorter neighbors, making them dark, less marketable, and less
ref. 8, p. 207
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valuable. Owners of the shorter buildings would be tempted to build
higher--in an effort to regain light and air--when it came time to re-
build, but that might not be for many years to come. Presumably, they
would not build taller until demand justified doing so. Thus, many suf-
fered for the economic benefit of a few owners of taller buildings.8
Matthews also conducted a survey of Boston's 125-foot office buil-
dings. He found, happily, that there were only seventy-eight, conclud-
ing that such a small number "disposes completely of the notion that
capital is tumbling over itself to build these 125-foot buildings in the
city." He did not reflect on whether the height limitations were the
cause of the low number; he simply assumed that a lack of demand was the
reason. He looked at those buildings within the seventy-eight which he
could find information on to see whether they were profitable. He found
common stock prices for twenty (they were held by trusts) but found only
four of these selling their stock at par value. The remaining sixteen
were selling at an average of $62 on the hundred, representing a loss of
some $7,500,000 from first costs. He had provided consultation on another
twenty or so of the original seventy-eight buildings and knew that none
of them paid an income to warrant selling them at anything near first
costs. Finally, by comparing his findings with building and site
characteristics, he arrived at the conclusion that financial advantages
accrued to skyscrapers when light was available from three or four sides.
In other words, access to light and air, not building height, made
buildings profitable. But why build high? Matthews concluded it was
for one or more of the following reasons: partly for investment, partly
through ignorance, for commercial advertising purposes, to have the
family name on a building, because of architects who want to display
their talents, and in self-defense of those nearby who might themselves
build tall. 8
The opposing view did not let Matthews' case rest. George Washburn
noted there was no appreciable opposition to extending district A boun-
daries and that most evidence was in fact in favor of doing so. Further-
more, if Matthews had looked further he would have found returns on low
buildings every bit as dismal as those for higher ones. In other words,
the variables affecting building profitability were evidently more com-
plex than building height and access to light and air. Washburn added
that the lack of visible, present demand for 125-foot buildings did not
bother him; the Commission was deciding for the future, and who could
tell what demand it might bring.8
33
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Matthews, furthering his cause, asserted that property values in
Back Bay and along Boylston Street had, since the 1904 restrictions went
into affect, jumped forty-seven and seventy-three percent respectively.
Additionally, many landowners in the areas had received, according to
the law, compensation from the city for value taken.8 Thus they had
benefitted from both an unearned increment on their property and from
public compensation.
Washburn countered, pointing out that Matthews had failed to con-
sider what had happened during the same period to property values in
district A and other areas of district B. Washburn alleged that district
A values had likely increased commensurately and that Back Bay values had
more to do with location and prestige than with lower building heights. 8
One of the more important issues was that of equitable treatment
under the height limitations. Some felt it was inequitable for property
on one side of a boundary--at most a street--to be subject to a lower
limit than that on the other side. A common plea was to eliminate
districts and put everybody on an equal basis. A case in point was made
by Boston University which wanted to build a 125-foot high education
building, but found a 100-foot height limitation on the site. They felt
that they should be allowed to build to 125 feet just as property
flow of capital...........
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owners in district A could.
Equity came up also when Nathan Matthews, while reminiscing about
how the 1904 limits were set, said that the Commission then was compelled
to allow 125-foot buildings in district A. This was because many buil-
dings had been built that high already; it would have been inequitable
to keep owners of nearby lower buildings from being able to do likewise.
However, Isaac Woodbury asserted that the 125-foot limit was set to please
downtown interests--that is, the old estates still holding their money
in Boston. Their political clout was, in his view, responsible for keep-
ing the city from being progressive.8
An interesting and related argument put forward by John J. Martin,
former president of MREE, was that height restrictions impeded develop-
ment because they were subject to change. That is, the law lacked pre-
dictability. Martin said that property falling under an 80-foot or 100-
foot limitation would not be improved if, in a few years, the boundaries
might be changed to allow 125-foot structures. He asserted that if
boundaries were fixed, landowners would hasten to improve their property.8
One of the purposes of the MREE and BREE was to promote commercial
and industrial growth of the city. They felt it should occur unimpeded
where it would, not simply in the downtown, district A area. Exchange
members generally felt that height limitations frustrated this goal.
George Washburn pleaded to the Commission to consider the future of
the city and give to communities like Dorchester, Charlestown, and South
and East Boston the same rights it had given the old families--the down-
town interests--of Boston. He found it insulting that Boston was the
only large city in the U.S. with a single major business center. Patrick
Kyle, a member of the Charlestown Improvement Association, concurred and
noted that Charlestown was well-served by railroads and therefore well-
adapted for business. He claimed height restrictions were keeping
Charlestown from developing the way it should by hindering the flow of
capital to that district. Apparently, other districts falling under the
limitations were suffering similarly.8
Height restrictions were also blamed for scaring capital away from
and out of Boston, further hampering the goals of the real estate ex-
changes. Frederick Woodruff, a real estate broker and member of both
exchanges, complained that Boston capital was leaving because legisla-
tion had ruined the real estate business in Boston. Investors knew
they could make more by investing in Atlanta, Kansas City, or Spokane.
He admitted that the inability to add two or three more stories to a
building was not the only problem; land values in the city were partly36
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to blame too. His point, simply, was that if investors could realize a
seven or eight percent return, the economic growth of the city would be
strengthened.8
A related concern was that other cities and states were competing
with Boston and Massachusetts for capital investment. This was appar-
ently understood by the state legislature, which was in the process of
revising the property tax system, a system blamed for chasing millions of
dollars out of the city and state. One who felt strongly about such
competition was W.L.F. Gilman. He said that the Commission and others
should employ every means available "to give (Boston) a chance to be as
big, wealthy, and great as the city that competes with (it)." Vividly
portraying the problem of height restrictions and capital investment was
a comment made by a prominent real estate trustee who was liquidating
all his Boston holdings.
..we are legislatured to death, restricted to death,
and they have put the screws to us so hard that we are
practically screwed to death....
An amendment extending the boundaries of district A was passed in
1916 by the state legislature. Speculation could be made about what
swayed their decision, especially in light of a letter from George
ref. 8, p. 234
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Washburn to the Commission chairman. Washburn wrote that MREE would fight
Nathan Matthews "in the most vigorous fashion, and the Commission would
be backed up by the most vigorous, progressive, and effective organiza-
tion in the Commonwealth in all matters pertaining to legislation."
Implied, of course, is that political pressure played a critical role in
the extension.
The extension of district A was not the end of development restric-
tion changes in Boston during that time. In 1917, a state referendum to
decide whether land use controls should be implemented passed with 161,214
in favor and 83,095 against at the state level, and 34,953 in favor and
8,673 against at the local level. In 1923 the allowable height limit in
district A was raised to 155 feet, and in 1924 the 1904 restrictions were
superseded by a comprehensive zoning plan. Elizabeth Herlihy said it was
difficult to assess the latter's economic impact on the city, but claimed
it succeeded in encouraging building development, protecting residential
areas, and stabilizing property values20
An ironic note on all this is offered by a 1922 letter to the
Chicago Real Estate Board (which was that year looking into the question
of building heights) from William Chamberlain of the BREE. He wrote that
height restrictions were responsible for development of previously
underdeveloped land and for generally increasing all land values. This
was, of course, antithetical to the arguments the BREE and other Boston
real estate interests had made six years earlier.
39
CHAPTER 3: CHICAGO: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CAREFUL ANALYSIS
NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES...
40
Chicago during the last half of the nineteenth century was a boom
town. From 1850 to 1870 its population grew tenfold--from 29,963 to
298,977--and by 1871, the city had, for numerous reasons, become the
focal point of U.S. commerce. The agricultural potential of the Missi-
ssippi Valley was being realized, bringing to the city rapidly growing
grain and meatpacking industries. In turn, these brought financial in-
stitutions, mills, grain storage facilities, and stockyards. An exten-
sive railway network linked the city in all directions to centers on the
east and west coasts. Also developed were waterways. Chicago's ideal
location on the Great Lakes, in conjunction with canals which had been
dug, were instrumental in making the city an important shipping port.
With the rail and waterways came increased shipments of raw materials.
Between 1860 and 1871, lumber shipments increased three and one-third
times, coal shipments increased six and two-thirds times, and the value
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of manufactured iron and steel products increased five times. In short,
the city had become a center of agricultural and industrial growth and
10
wealth.
Unfortunately, the fire of 1871 devastated much of what had been
built to accommodate this growth. The almost total loss of office space
created immediate demand for new office buildings. This demand was suc-
cessfully met in downtown (the Loop) where, within one year, it had been
largely reconstructed with four and five story buildings of brick and
stone. Built also were a few buildings of six, seven, and eight
stories.22
Economic demands for new buildings and evolving building technologies
presented new opportunities to talented Chicago architects. Collective-
ly they came to be known as the Chicago School, an informal group that
included some of the pioneers of skyscraper design: William Le Baron
Jenney, Louis Sullivan, Daniel Burnham, John W. Root, and William Hola-
bird, to name but a few.2 Jenney's Home Insurance Building (1885) was
an early example of the potential of steel-frame construction. Burnham
and Root's Monadnock Building (1889) is considered by some to be the
first skyscraper, despite its masonry structure. Tall buildings, like
these, did not at first meet with overwhelming public accepatnce, so41
fig. 20: Chicago, Masonic fig. 21: Chicago, Monadnock
Temple, Burnhcan and Root Building, Burnhcon and Root
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fig. 22: Chicago,
Reliance Building,
Burnham and Root
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Chicago builders, assuming this hesitancy would vanish, often built to
an acceptable and rentable height but overstructured the building to
allow additional stories to be added later. It seems that hesitancy
turned to acceptance with construction of Holabird and Roche's Tacoma
Building (1889).22 The decade following its completion saw a burst of
skyscraper construction in the city including, for example, Burnham and
Root's Reliance Building (1890-1894) and their Masonic Temple (1892).16
Of Chicago School architects, Louis Sullivan probably stands out
as most influential. He saw in the skyscraper and developing technologies
new opportunities for self-expression. The steel frame had freed archi-
tects from the trabeated forms used since the days of the Greeks and
Egyptians and the domed and arched forms of Roman and Gothic times.13
Accordingly, Sullivan led a campaign to strip skyscrapers of then popu-
lar neo-classicist stylings. He desired an unprecedented expression for
this new architectural form and for the materials from which it was
built.39 Sullivan asked
What is the chief character of the tall office building? And
at once we answer, it is lofty... It must be every inch a proud
and soaring thing, rising in sheer exhultation that from bottom
to top it is a unit without a single dissenting line.
Lewis Mumford has criticized Sullivan's statement and stated the reality
fig. 23: Chicago
in 1874
fig. 24: Chicago,
the Loop more
recently
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of skyscrapers a little more truthfully:
... in actuality, height in skyscrapers meant either a desire
for centralized administration, a desire to increase ground
rents, a desire for advertisement, or all three of these
together--and none of these functions determines a "proud and
soaring thing."
To Mumford and others--debates of style aside--the bottom line on
skyscraper commissions and their architects' creativity was satisfaction
of the economic and status needs of a growing corporate elite.
In time, opposition to skyscraper construction in the Loop emerged.
Behind the complaints were landowners and merchants outside of the Loop
who wanted to see lateral rather than vertical expansion; skyscraper
owners who wanted to keep the monopoly on height that they had; and
owners of older, lower buildings who protested increased tax assessments
and loss of tenants (they were fleeing to the new skyscrapers).22 These
complaints led to early height control legislation. In 1892, an ordi-
nance was passed, but then vetoed, to limit heights to 150 feet. The
following year, 1893, a 130-foot limitation was passed that remained in
affect until 1902.35 This limitation increased construction away from
the Loop and brought construction in the area to a standstill. As a
result, Loop office space was hard to find and demand was high, a situ-
ation that brought a fifteen percent increase in Loop rents. To
alleviate the problem, City Council passed an ordinance in 1902 to allow
heights of 260 feet.22 In 1910, the limit was lowered to 200 feet only
to be raised ten years later back to 260 feet.35 Unpredictability like
this was difficult to deal with. Property owners had had the maximum
height limitation changed so often and so arbitrarily that, for them,
it was time for something to be done. That something came in the form
of a zoning ordinance proposal by the city's Zoning Commission.
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To aid the Commission, the Chicago Real Estate Board (CREB) investi-
gated the topic of building heights. In April 1922, the Zoning Commit-
tee of the CREB was directed to establish a Citizen's Committee to hold
hearings to find out more about this matter. It was important because
the zoning ordinance proposal classified each area of the city into non-
overlapping use and volume districts. The latter embodied height limi-
tations. The objective of the hearings was to make equitable and perma-
nent height recommendations to the Zoning Commission.35
The hearings of the Citizen's Committee lasted six months. The
study, at the time, was said to be the most comprehensive ever prepared,
as Edward Bassett of New York noted: "No city in the United States
certainly, and very likely no city in the world, has ever before prepared
NEW YORK AND OTHER CITIES
The effect of Boston's 1904 height
regulations was an accidental differen-
tiation between residential and commer-
cial districts. It did not explicitly
control land use, and was therefore not
a comprehensive zoning plan.
The first comprehensive zoning plan
was passed by New York City in 1916.49
The ordinance met the requirements of a
state enabling act which, in effect, trans-
ferred police power from the state--the re-
pository of that power--to the city. This
gave to the city the right to pass laws
intended to protect the public's health,
safety and general welfare; laws that
would be constitutional as long as they
were not confiscatory, arbitrary, or un-
reasonable. 35
The ordinance controlled use and bulk
by limiting improvements on property in
three ways: regulation of use, building
heights, and site coverage. These vari-
ables were delineated on three separate
maps of the city, so landowners had to
refer to all three to know what improve-
ments they were allowed on their property.
Access to light and air was clearly one
motivation for the zoning ordinance. In
fact, Seymour Toll, in his book Zoned
America, comments that the Equitable
Building, a forty-two story skyscraper
rising straight from its property line,
foreshadowed a possibly undesirable New
York City environment: "The... Equitable
Building carried the development of the
skyscraper to such intolerable extremes
that, beyond any other structure, it may47
fig. 25: New York, Equitable
Building
be isolated as the one building which was
the final cause of zoning law." Another
motivation for the ordinance was to control
density.
The ordinance's height restrictions
were based on street width multiples, a sys-
tem where the allowable height for a building
is dependent upon the width of the street that
the property fronts and the height district
it falls within. There were five districts.
The maximum height allowed in each was one
of the following: two and one-half, two,
one and one-half, one and one-quarter, or
one times the street width. The underlying
'N-
fig. 26: New York, Wedding-cake
forms
reasoning of the system was to allow sun-
light into streets and the lower floors of
buildings. An imaginary line called the
angle of light was established. Buildings
could step back above the street width
multiple height as long as they did not
penetrate the imaginary angle of light.
This effected the "wedding-cake" forms of
early twentieth century skyscrapers in New
York. Notably, the angle of light concept
had been understood in the days of Leonardo
da Vinci and Sir Christopher Wren, but then48 a reasonable building height was a generous
411-
one-half times the width of the street. 14
There was also a tower privilege. It
allowed a tower to any height as long as the
area it covered did not exceed twenty-five
percent of the site area. The tower and
stepping back privileges of the ordinance
resulted in striking architectural forms
but also in a loss of density control. 49
New York's ordinance became a model
for cities across the country. By 1922,
the year the Chicago Real Estate Board was
holding its hearings, zoning had spread to
New England, to Florida, and as far away
as California. Consequently, there were
countless places the Board could look for
instruction. The state of the art of zoning
as they found it in 1922 looked something
like this:
Boston: passed in 1914
two classes: A, 125 feet
B, 80-100 feet
St. Louis: passed in 1918
five classes: 45-foot, 60-foot,
80 foot, 120-foot,
150-foot
Newark: passed in 1919
five classes: 35-foot, 50-foot,
85-foot, 125-foot,
150-foot
Pittsburgh: proposed
five classes: 2-1/2, 3, 6, 8
and 10 story
ref. 35, p. 166
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this underlying substructure of data so discriminately and minutely."
Testimony was hear from experts on an extensive list of subjects: light
and air to streets and buildings, street and transit congestion, fire and
panic, health issues, zoning experiences in other cities, and the economic
height of buildings.35 The issues that surfaced were primarily about
public health and safety and economics.
Like the Boston hearings, health and safety was a topic of focus,
but unlike those hearings, the participants in Chicago heard evidence
presented by experts in the field of public health. Again, the major
concerns were about light and air, congestion and fire.
Light and air were presumed to be consequential to both physiological
and psychological well-being. Professor George C. Whipple of Harvard
University, an authority on sanitation, spoke of the far-reaching attri-
butes of sunlight: "Health is more than the absence of disease. It is
something positive, and involves physique and vitality, and it is mental
as well as physical." Participants addressed directly the sun's ability
to kill bacteria. The health editor of the Chicago Tribune, Dr. W. A.
Evans, went into considerable depth on the findings of health research
on this topic and noted the time it took for the sun to kill certain
disease-causing bacteria. Professor Whipple commented on the sun's ef-
fects on mold, fungi, and infection. Furthermore, he asserted that sun-
created air movements were important because they carried away germs and
bacteria.35 Discussions on the importance of sunlight were often highly
descriptive. The chief sanitary inspector for Chicago saw the lack of
it leading to physical problems like eye strain, nervousness, and loss
of color, appetite, and weight; mental problems including depression and
irritability; and moral degradation, this point based on what the Bible
said about men "who loved darkness rather than light because their deeds
were evil." Another participant claimed that electric lights, the source
of light when sunlight was lacking, had no germ-killing powers and made
goods look awful and people look like corpses.35
There was another side to the issue. Mr. Tyson, a real estate ex-
pert, commented that the causal relationship between skyscrapers, dark
streets, and germs was largely theoretical; that electrical lighting and
mechanical ventilation had been much improved, thus making the argument
of dark and poorly ventilated spaces unjustified; and that skyscraper
offices were a refuge away from street dirt and noise, and surrounded
by good light and air. Edward Renwick, an architect, asserted that the
retail spaces of skyscrapers (the first one or two floors) were in fact
better ventilated than similar spaces in lower buildings. His logic50
ref. 35, p. 176
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was that tall buildings were like chimneys in that inside air movements
cleared the lower floors of stale, germ-laden air. F. W. Fitzpatrick,
an architect who had designed skyscrapers and helped establish building
code standards to make them safer, felt that as you went higher "the
happier is your environment." He added that "ventilation, street cleaning,
smoke-prevention, prevention of spitting, etcetera, would not be better-
ed because of lowering our limits." Moreover, he blatantly questioned
the importance of direct sunlight by making the observation that many
people tried to avoid it: some tenants preferred north orientations be-
cause direct sunlight disturbed their work; curtains on windows with other
exposures were often drawn for the same reason; and factories were known
to paint over their south-facing windows. Finally, near the end of the
hearings, after days and days of discussion on light and air, Fitzpatrick
made the important point that street orientation was just as critical
as street width and building height, the two variables always considered
when light and air were discussed.35 Other than this one time, street
orientation was never discussed and never appeared in early height re-
strictions.
It was generally acknowledged that skyscrapers increased conges-
tion, but it was not plain whether they deserved all of the blame.
Fitzpatrick said they were simply more conspicuous and that retail uses
and legitimate theatres were equally guilty.35 Dr. Evans, a skyscraper
critic, remarked that the increasing traffic volumes in the Loop were
having deleterious effects on health, as were other symptoms of conges-
tion. These included dirty streets, spitting, and lack of light and air.
He said that things like these increased the occurrence of coughs, colds,
influenza, pneumonia, and even more severe problems like tuberculosis,
diphtheria, and cerbrospinal meningitis. In addition, theYcontributed
to eye strain, headaches, fatigue, and work inefficiency. Finally, con-
gestion also threatened citizen safety because of the increased number
of automobile accidents. 3 5
Subways were seen as a cause of congestion and, by some, a solution
to it. Edward Bassett believed they were the latter, predicting that
Chicago would soon have subways and that they would clear the streets
of pedestrians. However, a local traffic engineer, R. F. Kelker, felt
subways would multiply the problem. He believed that the number of sub-
ways required to get people out of the Loop would add tremendously to
sidewalk congestion. Sidney Williams, another engineer, agreed and said
that New York's subways were crowded on the day they opened. Furthermore,
52 he noted that the transportation improvements being discussed for Chicago
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--double and triple decked streets, and construction of new boulevards--
would only increase congestion by urging more people to buy automobiles
and to come downtown. In the end, these improvements wuld add to the
taxpayers' woes while making congestion worse.35
Others saw economic benefits to increased transportation and con-
gestion. J.H. Prior, also an engineer, held that transportation was a
responsibility of government and public subsidy by which many benefitted:
the rider who had improved access to places, the landowner who was sell-
ing or leasing property and could thus get a better price, and the indus-
trial interest who could get skilled labor to the workplace easier.
Moreover, congestion was positive and desirable: it increased business
transactions and some people found it enjoyable.
Though forty-five years had passed since the fire of 1871, the
fear of a recurrence was clearly on some minds. Sidney Williams spoke
of the dangers of a fire in the Loop. He alleged that the loss of life
would be increased as a result of fire-fighting equipment being hindered
by traffic congestion and people trying to evacuate the area. He claimed
that fire-resistant construction held little salvation--building contents
could ignite with ease, regardless. Other design features were similar-
ly useless: provisions for egress--like elevators and stairways--were
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apt to fill with smoke, fire-escapes were useless above six stories,
and installation and maintenance of standpipes was often insufficient.
A fire department official, John Plant, emphasized that fire-fighting
equipment was ineffective above the fifth or sixth floor and surmised
that few occupants of tall office buildings knew the locations of fire
escapes and stairways.35
Of course others played down the threat. Bassett claimed that New
York's Woolworth Building was as safe as most low buildings, thanks to
its modern, internal fire-fighting equipment. Fitzpatrick said the solu-
tion to fire prevention was not making buildings shorter but instead
compelling owners to make them more fire resistive. He claimed--showing
immense personal faith--that in a large fire tall buildings actually
protect the buildings downwind'
The economic effects of height restrictions were an important point
of discussion, though somewhat less so than in Boston's hearings.
Discussions on building economy focused on the question of economic
height, again, that height at which the return on investment is maxi-
mized. Explained at the hearings were the grounds for the idea: at a
certain height additional costs for increased elevator and structural
capacity, combined with the rentable space that is lost with these
increases, take away from a building's profitability. Two studies on
economic height were presented at the hearings, each rather convincing.
Unfortunately the economic height differed for each. The difference
seems to be attributable to the fact that one study was a national sur-
vey while the other was based on Chicago conditions. If anything comes
out of the discussions on building height, it is that it is dependent on
local conditions.
The first study was presented by Earle Shultz, president of the
National Association of Building Owners and Managers. It was a study of
the gross income, net income, and expenses of 185 buildings located in
forty U.S. cities. An important trend it indicated was that expenses
(gross minus net income) grew at a faster rate than net income, imply-
ing that increased expenses would offset increased income at some point.
He found that point, the economic height, to be at twenty-four stories.35
The second study was undertaken by an architect (and advocate for
lower buildings), George Nimmons. He ran pro formas on hypothetical
buildings five to thirty stories in height in five story increments.
Given his assumptions and estimations, the economic height of a Chicago
skyscraper was twenty stories with a return on investment of about
55 seven percent at that height. Nimmons felt that the risks of skyscraper
property values...........
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investments warranted a return of at least eight to ten percent.
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Edward Basset confirmed that economic height was variable not just
from one city or block to another but also on the same site over time.
He commented that experiences in New York had shown that a single twenty-
one story skyscraper on a block has a better return than when that block
fills up with twenty-one story structures. Additionally, tall buildings
steal light and air from neighboring lower buildings, making them less
desirable and lowering their returns. Telling the owners of lower buil-
dings that they could build higher did little in the way of appeasing
them.35
Testimony at the hearings accused the skyscraper of being a specu-
lator's dream; one noticed by both real estate brokers and city tax
assessors. Nimmons hypothesized that property values were inflated when
real estate brokers realized that the rents collected from a given piece
of property would be higher if buildings were taller. An owner realiz-
ing an increased monthly income could then conceivably pay back on a
larger debt service. Nimmons implies that property sellers felt this
was justification enough to raise property values. He went on to say
that higher property values and rents had materialized in all communi-
ties where a building considerably higher than the city's average height
was built. It was his opinion that height limitations would curb this
35
cycle of artifical inflation of property values and rents. In other
words, if the potential to build exceedingly high was not there, the
temptation to raise property values would be eliminated.
There was evidence that height limitations helped property values
in other ways. George Mortimer, a businessman, noted that New York's
zoning had helped stabilize and improve property values in general. And
William Chamberlain of the Boston Real Estate Exchange cited that height
controls in Boston had effected a more even distribution of development
throughout the city and had helped control great disparities in land
35
prices.
Worth mentioning at this point are insights from another source:
Homer Hoyt's One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago (1933). Care-
ful research on his part showed that prior to Chicago's skyscraper boom
land values in the Loop were based on construction of a six-story
structure. An impressive, profitable looking financial set-up could be
produced if a skyscraper was assumed to be built on a piece of property
valued in such a way. This alone was incentive enough for some people
to build taller. Further impetus was added by the prestige of building
a skyscraper or occupying an office in one. Prestigious buildings and57
ref. 22, p. 152
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heights could demand higher rents, further adding to property values.
Together, such influences resulted in a marked increase in Loop property
values between 1889 and 1891 and culminated in revaluation of all down-
town property based on a sixteen-story building sitting on each site;
this at a time when twelve to sixteen-story buildings covered no more than
seven percent of the downtown district. The slogan of the day became:
"Tear down that old rat trap and erect a sixteen-story building'" Even
if landowners elected not to, when it came time to sell their property
they priced it as if they had, adding more fuel to spiraling land values
and building costs.
Hoyt points out that the entire Loop could not have gone to sixteen
stories without creating an oversupply of office space. In fact, in the
early 1890's an oversupply did occur, causing an exodus from older, out-
moded properties in the Loop. Based on sixteen-story property valua-
tions, the return for some of these older structures dropped to two per-
cent. Additionally, the concentration of more people in skyscraper
areas generated even higher property values, especially when retail uses
accompanied the buildings.
2 2
Looking back, then, it seems that the skyscraper set in motion a
spiraling cycle of increased height, leading to increased land values,
leading to increased height and concentration, leading to increased
land values, and so on.
Earl Shultz also presented a study indicating a causal relationship
between the ups and downs of Chicago's building industry and height
controls. His conclusion was that controls slowed construction. He
alleges, for example, that the 130-foot limit enacted in 1893 drastically
reduced office space construction until 1901 when the limit was raised;
and that between 1909 and 1914 the threat of reducing the limit resulted
in a flurry of building activity. For the most part, the study was con-
vincing. Still, August Gatzert, a merchant from outside of the Loop
interested in seeing stricter height limitations imposed, commented that
another decline Shultz had pointed out--between 1914 and 1920--coincided
with World War I, and certainly it must have had some effect.3 5 Implied
by this is that other influences--e.g., economic cycles or, as Mumford
has pointed out, a shortage of steel because of armament production--
could be partly or wholly responsible for the downturn.
EPILOGUE.................. The mandate of the Citizen's Committee was to help CREB make a
recommendation to the Chicago Zoning Commission on the issue of building
59 heights, which it did. The Citizen's Committee itself made no
recommendations, but during the closing days of the hearings George
Nimmons, a staunch supporter of lower limits, made his own zoning or-
dinance proposal. Briefly, it called for height controls based on
street width: 180 feet on streets 66 feet wide and less; 200 feet on
80-foot wide streets; and 220 feet on 100-foot wide streets. His pro-
posal also called for tower and step-back privileges. Conversely, the
Zoning Commission's ordinance allowed buildings in some areas to go to
264 feet with tower and step-back privileges also allowed. Nimmons
maintained that his "moderate" height proposal was better because it
would help stabilize land values and benefitted ninety percent of the
landowners rather than only a few.35
The Zoning Committee of the CREB, after some debate, recommended
Nimmons' proposal. Attached to the recommendation for these lower
limits were a number of considerations, many reflecting an awareness of
the public interest: first, public welfare would have dictated even
lower heights had that been the only consideration; second, no injustice
was perpetrated against land owners since the capacities of streets would
be reached far before the city was filled with tall buildings; third,
business would be more evenly distributed through the city; fourth, a
lower return on investment was realized in buildings over twenty60
stories; fifth, by actual count, Chicago's streets were the most crowded
in the world; and, sixth, all other cities passing zoning ordinances
were reducing their height limitations. 35
It was to no avail. The city adopted in 1923 a zoning ordinance
designating each piece of property by allowable use and volume. There
were five volume districts, each designating a maximum height and
volume that could be exceeded under certain conditions. Moreover, there
was a tower privilege for each district. The per floor area of a tower
could not exceed twenty-five percent of the site area nor one-sixth of
the allowable building volume below the tower. The intent of the
volume districts was to regulate the height and bulk of buildings, the
intensity of use of a site, and to control the amount of open space
around a building. The concept of volume districts at first seems
quite unique. However, the standards indicate that the volumes are
dictated by maximum heights, step-backs, and towers, the same as they
were in New York. Worth noting is that controlling the intensity of
use (i.e., controlling congestion) cannot be done well by limiting volum
or even height alone. Under either system, a developer could simply
lower ceiling heights to increase the number of floors, thereby increas-
ing the intensity of use. Clearly, what needs to be controlled are61
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fig. 27: Chicago 1922 Zoning
Ordinance, Use and Voiwne Districts
fig. 28: 1922 volume standards fig. 29: 1922 use standards
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floor areas.
At any rate, what was the ordinance's impact? Homer Hoyt pointed
out that, for one, the Loop's twenty-two story plateau of pre-zoning con-
trols had been marred by twenty or so towers dotting the skyline. Too,
increased height limitations in hand with real estate boom years had
fueled "building replacement," a practice engaged to increase the econom-
ic productivity of a piece of property, even if it meant razing an other-
wise good building. Few sites downtown had not been built on at least
three or four times, and, in fact, by 1930 seventy percent of the cubage
in the Loop had been built since 1900. There were also 5000 amendments
to the zoning ordinance granted in the first ten years of its existence.
Evidently landowners had had no trouble getting higher and better uses
approved if they so desired. In Hoyt's words, the ordinance "did not
impose a very serious limit on the use of land."
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fig. 31: Washington, D.C.,
late eighteenth century
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Contrary to popular belief, Pierre Charles L'Enfant did not con-
sider building heights in his planning of Washington, D.C., even though
he wanted views within the city enhanced. His intentions for these
views are manifested in the width and orientation of the main avenues
and the use of the city's natural topography to highlight monuments.
The earliest expression of the need for height controls originated with
President Washington and Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State. One
of Jefferson's responsibilities in the newly-formed government was to
act as liaison between L'Enfant, President Washington, and a three-
member commission appointed by the President. This commission was to
aid in the city's planning and development. Inquiries by the President
and commission on city planning matters received enlightened replies
from the well-read and travelled Secretary of State. For example, a
November 1790 note from Jefferson commented that Paris had height
CHAPTER 4:
controls for houses to make them convenient, easier to manage in case of
a fire, and low enough to allow light and air into the streets. In a
note from March 1791 he asserts that a similar limit would be good for
the Capital. 9
Continued discussion resulted in the first two building regulations
for Washington, D.C. They became effective on October 17, 1791. One
stipulated masonry exterior walls and party walls for all houses. This
was to help control the spread of fires. The second limited the height
of houses to forty feet generally and to no less than thirty-five feet
on avenues. The result of the regulations was unfortunate. Houses
following their standards were too expensive for most laborers, keeping
them from settling in the city and thus impeding the city's development.
The regulations were suspended in 1796 and continued to be so during the
terms of Jefferson and Monroe. It was not until the end of the nine-
teenth century that building heights again became a pressing issue in
the Capital.9 The balance of this chapter looks at height regulations
enacted for the city during that time.
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Modern height regulations for Washington have their roots in a
regulation passed in 1894. A building permit was issued that year for
the Cairo Hotel, a 160-foot tall, steel-frame structure. (It is still
the tallest privately owned building in the city.) Negative reaction
to the approved structure was immediate. The Washington Evening Star
of August 27, 1894, remarked that such a structure might be desirable
in a "commercial city," but not a nation's capital. The Board of
Commissioners for the District of Columbia quickly enacted building
height regulations to cut off any tide of similarly tall buildings. The
regulations included three standards: first, no building height was to
exceed the width of the street it fronted on; second, no building in
residential areas was to exceed 90 feet; third, no building in commer-
cial areas was to exceed 110 feet. Not surprisingly, the explicit
grounds for the standards were the need for light and air, the threat
of fire, the limitations of fire-fighting equipment, and protection of
property values.9 The implicit grounds were that as the Capital,
Washington's cityscape had to satisfy an important symbolic need; it
had to express the city's role as the home of the federal government.
During the 55th Congress (1897 to 1899), the House Committee on the
District of Columbia was given the responsibility for questions pertaining
1910 HEIGHT LIMITATIONS...
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to District building heights. All such matters were to be sent to the
Committee for their recommendation, then forwarded to Congress for ap-
proval or disapproval if an exemption was being requested. This meant
that congressmen, not local officials, decided if taller buildings than
allowed by law could be built in the Capital.
In 1899, Representative Joseph W. Babcock proposed a legislative
bill to make the 1894 regulations statutory law. The bill included two
provisions altering the earlier limitations: first, thellO-foot height
limitation for commercial areas was changed to 130 feet on avenues 160
feet wide; second, the limitations did not apply to federal and munici-
pal buildings. In arguing for the bill's passage, the House Committee
asserted that skyscrapers were becoming a nuisance in many cities and
that the solution was to impose height limits. They noted that Boston
and Chicago had done this, setting maximum heights of 125 and 130 feet
respectively. The 1899 law was modelled after theirs and went into
9
affect on March 1, 1899.
A bill modifying the 1899 limitations came before Congress in 1910.
It allowed an additional twenty feet in height, with height not to
exceed 130 feet, for fireproof construction on business streets. This
was argued for on the grounds that demand for taller buildings existed
in the business district. The bill met with some opposition, but ap-
parently only one senator wondered if liberalizing building heights
would harm the city's beauty. Also, as originally proposed, the bill
would have allowed 160-foot tall buildings on a single block along
Pennsylvania Avenue. This sparked a public outcry, especially since
it sailed through the Senate with little debate, thus appearing to be
a case of blatant favoritism. The May 5, 1910 edition of The Washington
Evening Star said: "This is the most pernicious form of legislation.,.
(height restrictions) should apply without exception to all classes and
all individuals and all blocks, and should not be waived... for the bene-
fit of the favored few." The Star discovered later that a hotel interest
had requested the 160-foot limit for the length of the avenue between
1st and 15th, and that somehow this had been misunderstood by the Senate.
The bill was redrafted with a 160-foot height allowed between 1st and
15th along Pennsylvania Avenue and was signed into law on June 1, 1910.9
RELAXING THE
LIMITATIONS................ Over the years a number of bills for exemption from the 1910 law
have come before Congress. There have been seven in all, of which
two are described below: the Harrington Hotel and the National Press
69 Club.
The Harrington Hotel requested an exemption to allow a 130-foot
tall building in an area with a 110-foot limitation. Existing in the
area were a few hotels of the height being requested. These had been
built before the 1910 law was in affect.36 Both Houses of Congress
were concerned that allowing the exemption would set a precedent and in-
crease the frequency of such requests, thereby voiding the intent of
the 1910 law. The request also surfaced a number of pleas to keep
the city's aesthetic qualities intact. A Senator, Mr. King, felt
strongly that the city's architectural harmony and beauty would be
destroyed if building heights varied too much, and Representative
Blanton said the Capital should be "a city of beauty rather than a city
of commercial uses." Still, except for a few comments like these, the
proposed exemption met with little opposition, an important reason being
precedent set by the existing hotels. The upshot was that the amend-
9
ment passed on January 21, 1925.
The bill for the National Press Club exemption came before Congress
in 1926 and asked to allow a 150-foot building. This was in excess of
the height allowed. The arguments that ensued were heated and an ad-
ministrative idiosyncracy added some interest. Taking the latter first,
it should be pointed out that Congress established zoning for Washington,70
D.C. in 1920. This law prescribed no height limitations, per se, but
gave to a Zoning Commission, also established by Congress, the discretion
to set limits as long as they did not exceed those established in 1910.
Accordingly, the Zoning Commission put in place 40-foot, 55-foot, 85-
foot, and 100-foot height districts.32 The district boundaries did not
match perfectly the 1910 limitations. The Club's site was simultane-
ously within 110-foot Commission district and under a 130-foot 1910
limitation. Thus the proposal was twenty feet above one rule and forty
feet above another. The final height allowed was 140 feet, halfway
9
between a 20-foot addition to each limit.
The debates on the exemption were lengthy. The Club's arguments
were these: heights of existing buildings near the site were in excess
of the proposal (these were built before the law was enacted); light and
air would not be cut off from the wide, bordering streets; there were
no protests from adjacent property owners; and the proposed height helped
maintain a "uniformity of skyline," an important intent of the 1910
building law. These arguments were convincing enough to get the Club
what it wanted (almost) but were not so convincing as to vanquish all
opposition. Senator King expressed anxiety over the city's aesthetic
71
qualities. He claimed that the Capital would never be beautiful if greedy
interests were allowed to much leeway, that nations were judged by their
architecture, and that there is a "universal desire" to have capitals
of beauty. He worried too about setting precedents, disclosing that he
had already been queried about giving similar privileges if the bill
passed. Another Senator, Mr. Harreld, was similarly concerned and as-
serted that it was unfair to treat one person or group differently from
others. If he supported this request he would have to support all
others like it. A Representative Hill was worried about a growing
trend "to destroy the zoning regulations and other precautions which
(had) been enacted in order that the Capital city should retain and
ref. 9, p. 80 develop its unique beauty."
Other Congressmen argued for the exemption. Senator Harrison
mentioned that property values had risen in the Capital just as they had
in other large cities and that unduly harsh limits would retard devel-
opment of the city if builders were forced to build such low buildings.
Senator Bruce felt a little differently. It was his contention that
the city could have been the most beautiful in the world but had missed
the opportunity. Since it was too late, burdening the District with
72 stringent height limits would only short-change the material needs of
citizens by restraining the large business interests to which he felt
the city was entitled. This was especially important since business
was playing an important role in the rapidly growing city.9
OTHER OPINIONS.............
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The National Capital Park and Planning Commission was established
in 1924 to oversee District parklands and help preserve its natural
features. These responsibilities were found so linked with other con-
cerns that an act to broaden the Commission's mandate was soon passed.
Their responsibilities grew to include, among other things, schools,
airport siting, highways, and zoning. 3 3 The Commission looked serious-
ly at zoning and, within that topic, building heights. They found that
a trend towards relaxing the city's height limits was having negative
impacts, especially as regards access to light and air and increasing
traffic congestion. Notably, cutting off light and air--rather than
harming health--was seen as injurious to Washington's tree-lined
streets, an amenity of consequence given the city's sweltering summers.
Traffic congestion, they pointed out, would increase pressure on public
services and, therefore, on municipal finances. For example, costly
improvements to sewer and water systems and streets and avenues would
33
be needed.
The Commission also expressed concern over property values and ec-
onomic equity. The unearned increment enjoyed by recipients of height
exemptions were considered inequitable since neighboring property
owners were denied for an undetermined amount of time the natural in-
crement they deserved. Such exemptions inflated the recipient's property
value and deflated everyone else's, a disparity that was increased
further by property taxes which, in the Capital, were based on what
might be built rather than what was built. The Commission also saw the
exemptions as blighting. They commented on studies of New York sky-
scraper districts that found such areas enjoyed terrifically high val-
uations while areas nearby were losing tenants and experiencing disin-
vestment. Height limits, they said, would keep this from happening,
would help maintain the existing citywide property value average, and
would allow nominal valuation increases for many landowners rather than
33
extreme ones for a few.
The Commission also expressed interest in the Capital as a
national symbol. They pointed out that the dome of the Capitol
Building, the embodiment of American government, was fast becoming lost
amongst penthouses and water tanks.33 Their view was that "from what-
ever direction it is seen the Capitol dome should look down upon the74
ref. 32, p.
spectator from a height and dominate the city over which it was intend-
ed to preside."
More emphatic in this respect was the Washington Committee of
100, a group concerned with, among other things, the Capital's beauty.
They argued that architecture is an index of civilization and that
Washington should represent that fact. They said Washington should be
the most beautiful capital in the world; it should provide a setting
that would communicate to diplomats and tourists from abroad the pride
Americans hold for their country; and its beauty should instill
patriotism and set an example for U.S. citizens to carry back to their
hometowns.
In sum, building height debates in early twentieth-century Wash-
ington were simultaneously different and similar to those in other
cities. They were different in that the city's beauty and symbolic
purposes were of utmost importance in terms of presenting a memorable
image of America and its government. Such concerns were primarily of
national rather than local interest. On the other hand, it was apparent
that building heights were understood to be linked, as in Boston and
Chicago, to city development, real estate economics, and health and
safety. The fact that they received less emphasis in Washington can be75
explained by the Capital's unique position and responsibilities.
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Business came to a standstill in the spring of 1933; the old
dreams had vanished and with them all traces of the City
Beautiful. A new world was to confront the American people
after 1933, and to the City Efficient would now fall the
task of trying to solve a multitude of urban problems and
ref. 45, p. 234 of stemming the growing disorder of the urban scene.
NEW ARGUMENTS...............
ref. 45, p. 215
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The end of World War I brought with it significant changes to the
16
U.S.'s role in the world. Now a world leader and creditor, many of its
most prominent citizens were acquiring international stature and amassing
unprecedented wealth and power. Christopher Tunnard wrote of this time
It was the America of the Jazz Age that loomed so large on the
international scene in the decade following the First World
War. For the first time Americans were called on to assume
responsibilities they had never held before, as they became bank-
ers and manufacturers of the world. J.P. Morgan and Company
was working closely with the Banks of England and France;
Dillon Read and Company was financing the steel and coal mag-
nates of the Ruhr; and Henry Ford was scattering subsidiaries like
seeds over the face of the earth.
Times were prosperous, at least for a while. Though the Depression
was soon to come, a building boom brought on by corporate expansion al-
lowed architects to continue designing skyscrapers. Among the many sky-
scrapers built was the Empire State Building, for many years the world's
tallest building. Completed in 1930 and designed by Shreve, Lamb and
CBAPTER 5:
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Harmon, its 102 story steel frame was erected at the rate of one floor
per day, an achievement made possible by superior job coordination and a
work force of some 3500. Despite this, the Depression and an oversupply
of office space in New York left it largely vacant for many years. Vin-
cent Scully asserts that as such it symbolically marked the end of some
forty years of eclectic, Beaux-Arts skyscraper design.45
Skyscraper debates also continued to flourish, and not just in
organized debates. Daily newspapers, trade journals, and magazines
brought the topic to the public's attention, summarizing the issues dis-
cussed in the preceding chaptem and raising some new ones as well. One
probable reason for the public's interest was simply the growing number
of skyscrapers. New York epitomized the trend. In the decade following
World War I buildings more than 150 feet tall had been built in the city
at a rate of over one hundred per year, and the number of non-residential
elevators had reached 15,600.42 Some people were becoming wary of so
many skyscrapers and their effects on cities and each other. Henry
James, who had been a consultant on the Regional Plan for New York, be-
moaned the tendency for skyscrapers to huddle together, driving up pro-
perty values and thus paving the way for more of their own. He feared
a glut of skyscraper space, a commodity difficult to consume quickly
fig. 37: Chic
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and impossible to export. It was his opinion that the height and loca-
tion of skyscrapers, a minority of any city's buildings, had adverse
effects on the welfare of the entire city. Henry Curran, a former bur-
ough president for Manhattan, cautioned that the growing number of sky-
scrapers was bringing visual disarray to city skylines and taking away
from the beauty of existing skyscrapers. The attractiveness of the
Woolworth and Singer towers in New York had been destroyed in this way
as had that of the Chicago Tribune Building. He added that the archi-
tectural ideals of the City Beautiful movement--e.g., classically propor-
tioned and embellished buildings--were being destroyed by the abundance
of tall buildings.
Congestion was also discussed in the press. Raymond Hood, a sky-
scraper architect, claimed that skyscraper-induced congestion had brought
demand for subways to help alleviate the problem; unfortunately, though,
U
l~ ** *new skyscrapers followed the new subways bringing with them even more
of Jcongestion. Too, property owners began raising property values in an-
ticipation of subway construction that had not even begun, thus setting
~ago, Chicago 2
ing, Raymond off the common pattern of spiraling land values.2 1  Curran maintained
that public expenditures for subways shortchanged other public services
like schools, parks, and playgrounds.6 Congestion and elevators were
also linked. Harvey Wiley Corbett, a skyscraper advocate and architect,
alleged that tall buildings saved cities from congestion because of ele-
vators which transferred horizontal movement into vertical. As the argu-
ment went, this kept people inside buildings and off of streets and side-
18
walks. He went on to say that skyscraper districts helped to ease con-
gestion by virtue of densities which put most everyone in the district
within walking distance of each other. Thus, even if people had to
leave their buildings, at least they did not have to use a car, the
source of most congestion.6
The economic height question continued to be elusive. In 1927,
the National Association of Real Estate Boards offered a $1000 reward to
anyone who could come up with a firm answer. Fred E. Reed, a vice presi-
dent of that association, said that several factors needed consideration:
city size, site value, site accessibility, and the height of surround-
ing buildings. Implied, of course, is that there is no universal eco-
nomic height.6
Also in the 1920s, there emerged a notion that skyscraper problems
were inexorably tied to densities and open space. Ralph Walker, an
architect, posited that skyscrapers would one day dot suburban areas,
and that there would be expanses of open space between them.1880
Similarly, Henry James said that spreading skyscrapers some distance apart
would have definite benefits, for example more light and air and reduced
congestion.2 5 Finally, a businessman from Los Angeles passed on the ex-
perience of a corporation that had moved from the city center into the
midst of suburban tranquility: their employees were happier, business
could be done more leisurely, and patronage had increased.6 Ideas about
the positive attributes of mixed-use development also surfaced. Raymond
Hood, for instance, imagined a skyscraper elevated on columns. The
ground floor would be left for walking, motor vehicles, and parking.
This would be followed with, first, multiple floors of shops and theatres,
then offices, then clubs, restaurants, and hotel accommodations, and above
all this (in the sun and fresh air) would be apartments.21 Mass produc-
tion of the automobile and the highways it spawned were major forces for
cities and regions to contend with. Wealthy families were leaving or
moving to new districts within cities, and slowly following them were
immigrants finally able to afford housing outside of the poor neighbor-
hoods they had once been herded into. Still, the slums remained. Not
everyone could afford to move and those who could were typically replaced
by blacks trying to get away from the prejudice of the South. 4 5
Against the backdrop of changes like these--and the problems they81
caused--came a move to better understand the making of cities: a move
from the City Beautiful to the City Efficient. This was likely best
represented by the Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs.
Completed in 1929, the study investigated urban and regional planning
concerns like highway traffic, transit, public recreation, neighborhood
and community planning, and economics. The concept underlying the study
was that the region should be the base for master planning. There was
also a growing understanding of the space economy of cities, the best
example being a recurring pattern of urban land uses uncovered by Eduard
C. Lindeman and Nels Anderson. The pattern was of concentric circles with
a city center of high-rent office and commercial uses in the middle.
This was surrounded by increasingly large circles of 1) an area of tran-
sients, 2) working-class neighborhoods, 3) a ring of single-family resi-
dences, and 4) the suburbs.45
Following the Depression were new opportunities and ideas that were
to influence the course of American (and worldwide) architecture and
planning. For one, the New Deal and the radical political and economic
reforms it embodied were born. Among the programs and agencies it brought
were the National Housing Act of 1934 and the U.S. Housing Authority of
1937. These provided an impetus for publicly subsidized housing, much82
eventually to be accommodated in skyscrapers. The roots of this idea--
and countless others that influenced American designers--lie with then
contemporary architecture and planning theories emanating from Europe.
Like the Bauhaus, most had political and social underpinnings. Additional-
ly, their influence on Americans was abetted by the immigration to the
U.S. of some of Europe's most talented designers, among them Gropius,
Breuer, Moholy-Nagy, and Mies van der Rohe.
One of the most important architectural theories to come from Europe
was Le Corbusier's "five points." These called for buildings to be 1)
raised from the ground on pilotis, with 2) roof terraces, 3) free plans,
4) horizontal windows, and 5) free facades. Presented in 1927, these
features represented a fundamentally new aesthetic in which buildings
were given maximum access to sunlight and air and the ground plane was
freed for automobiles, pedestrians, and open space.11 As noted earlier,
some American skyscraper architects were talking of similar possibilities,
though their aesthetic expressions were quite different than Le Corbu-
sier's.
Also important at this time were the ideas of Mies van der Rohe.
Some of his early proposals presage the majority of skyscraper designs
of the last thirty years; for example, his 1921 design for a glass83
fig. 38: Le Corbusier's five points, 1927,
compared to then contemporary standard
construction
fig. 39: Mies van der Rohe, 1922,
reinforced concrete building
fig. 40: Mies van der Rohe, 1921
glass and steel skyscraper
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skyscraper and a 1922 design for a reinforced concrete officeblock. He
said of these proposals:
The office building is a house of work, of organization, of
clarity, of economy. Bright, wide wcrkrooms, easy to over-
see, undivided except as the organism of the undertaking is
divided. The maximum effect with the minimum of means. The
materials are concrete, iron, glass. Reinforced concrete
buildings are by nature skeletal buildings. No noodles or
armoured turrets. A construction of girders that carry the
weight, and walls that carry no weight. That is to say,
buildings of skin and bones.
This statement and Le Corbusier's five points capture much of the
modern movement aesthetic. The aesthetic was quickly embraced by many
American architects but with little if any consideration for the politi-
cal and social foundations upon which it had been based. Slick and
functional, it in time became the style of new American skyscrapers and
a new symbol for the country's corporate elite. It was invoked whenever
the wealthy wished to present themselves in a progressive and powerful
16
way.
European theorists also influenced American notions of urban design.
One of the most important influences (mostly European but not entirely)
was the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). Formed in
1928, the CIAM was a forum to discuss architecture and town planning
85
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and the role they should play in helping to improve urban settings.
CIAM's most important discussions on these matters came in 1933 when the
group's emphasis moved from a mixture of architecture and town planning to
entirely the latter. The document they produced was the Athens Charter,
"the most Olympian, rhetorical, and ultimately destructive document to
come out of CIAM." One of its 111 propositions proclaimed "the city
no longer serves its function, which is to shelter human beings and shel-
ter them well." Much of the blame for this was placed on the profit mo-
tive, a goal they claimed ignored any consideration of sound planning
principles. Consequently, they called for a cadre of qualified planning
specialists to see that such principles were adhered to.
One of the most destructive principles was the rigid zoning of
dwellings, recreation, work, and transporation. Today, the negative con-
sequences of this separation of functions are well understood. One of its
worst outcomes has been that many areas of our cities are now lifeless
and unsafe for much of each day. Another destructive principle was that
of a single form or urban housing in "high, widely spaced apartment
blocks wherever the necessity of housing a high density of population
exists." This formalized a notion that skyscrapers could accommodate
housing, whereas previously they had been limited to retail, office
V0
fig. 41, 42: Le Corbusier's
vizle Radieuse 807
and hotel uses.
CIAM's principles were given physical form (at first only on paper)
through numerous urban design proposals. These proposals are significant
in that they provided an image of how skyscrapers could be incorporated
within new urban forms; forms which would purportedly help alleviate
many urban problems, including those associated with skyscrapers. The
most significant early examples came from Le Corbusier: for example,
the Ville Contemporaine (1922), a city for three million that Vincent
Scully claims, because of its diagonals and axiality, is a direct des-
cendant of L'Enfant's plan for Washington;38 the Plan Voisin (1925),
a scheme of straight motorways and cruciform skyscrapers that was to be
laid over the fine-grained, chaotic pattern of Paris; and Ville Radieuse
(1928-1946), an evolving scheme which had as one of its main components
dwelling units in skyscrapers.38 Like Le Corbusier's five points for
a new architecture, these had significant impact on architecture and
planning. He reveled in the thought of city dwellers enjoying sunlight,
fresh air, and "high" living; he saw great potential in the automobile
and claimed that "a city made for speed is a city made for success;"
he raised buildings to free the land for travel and then created
88
fig. 45, 46 (below): Le Corbusier, 1922,
Ville Contemporaine
fig. 43, 44 (above): Le Corbusier, 1925,
Plan Voisin
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fig. 47: New York,
Stuyvesant Town (top)
fig. 48: New York, Alfred
E. Snith Houses (below)
hierarchical street networks; and he promoted the notion of towers in
vast, green open spaces, an idea with urban form consequences antitheti-
cal to traditional patterns of blocks and street walls.
In sum, the effects of these ideas on cities have been stupefying.
One important outcome has been highrise housing, a trend which picked
up in the U.S. and Europe after World War II. Among early U.S. examples
were Metropolitan Life's Stuyvesant Town (1947), a project for middle
income families, and the Alfred E. Smith Houses (1948), a low-cost
38
public housing project. This pattern of housing was accepted uncriti-
cally at the time, with little thought given to its social and behavior-
al impacts. Such concerns, well-known today but maybe still not consi-
dered enough, include problems of child rearing, resident safety, increas-
ed segregation of the poor (usually minorities), and effects on existing
neighborhoods. As such, highrise housing has been an important focus
of man-environment studies and numerous debates. For example, these
issues were critical in stopping Cedar-Riverside, a large-scale, mixed-
use development in Minneapolis.
Another outcome of Le Corbusier's projects has been countless
large-scale redevelopment projects. Regarding American examples,
90
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Vincent Scully has said
Cataclysmic, automotive, and suburban: these have been the
pervasive characteristics of Urban Redevelopment in
America...they are exactly in accord with the most persis-
tent American myths and desires: the city is bad, tear it
down, get on the road, be a pioneer, live in Greenwich like
a white man. So redevelopment became a way to appear to plan
but not really to plan. It encouraged all kinds of forces that
existed; real-estate men, automobiles, and so on, and it came to
function as such forces suggested or required.
Redevelopment has been indulged in with greal zeal and has come to be
criticized for numerous reasons: it tends to destroy existing social
patterns, encourages jarring physical discontinuities, increases traf-
fic congestion, requires larger streets and highways to service it,
inflicts environmental impacts, and so on. In the U.S., redevelopment
is sometimes associated with public housing for the poor but most often
associated with large-scale commercial and office ventures. The latter,
in particular, has brought an onslaught of skyscrapers and changes to
American cities and has given an ever-increasing visibility to powerful,
corporate interests.
In sum, despite the early debates, skyscraper construction has
flourished largely to satisfy the ever-present corporate needs of ex-
pansion and prestige. Skyscrapers have also found new usefulness in
the form of highrise housing. Architects and planners, rather than
trying to restrain skyscraper construction, have acknowledged their
problems and developed theories of city design to (supposedly) incor-
porate them in sensitive ways. Today, it is widely recognized that
these theories have fallen far short of expectations, resulting not
only in more skyscrapers but also the host of problems mentioned above.
As the problems have persisted, so have the debates.
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SAN FRANCISCO: MANHATTANIZATION
The old city grew beautiful by accident, the new one
ref. 5, p. 14 is growing ugly by design.
DIVERGENT GOALS............
ref. 24, p. 26
93
San Francisco is blessed with a beautiful and distinctive setting:
a hilly peninsula surrounded by the waters of the Pacific Ocean and San
Francisco Bay; rolling hills which afford views to the land and sea and
help create places with their own identities and meanings; special places
like Nob Hill and Telegraph Hill which are known to resident and visitor
alike. Herb Caen, a journalist, has commented on the residents' feelings:
The San Franciscan never tires of looking at the face
of his city...There is always a stray strand of fog across
the sun to cast a new light over the rambling hills.
The San Franciscan likes to look at his own city, as though
to remind himself of his singular good fortune.
The city's gridiron street plan confronts the natural topography
to produce the steep streets the city is famous for. Historically,
these have been lined with low buildings known for their ornateness and
human scale.24 Development in the city is also very dense. The city's
700,000 residents are packed some 16,000 per square mile, making it,
CHAPTER 6:
fig. 49: San Francisco,
districts and landmarks
fig. 50, 51 (below): San Francisco,
density, texture, and detail
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next to New York, the second densest city in the U.S.6 Another impor-
tant feature is the city's open space. Parks and public lands are ir-
replaceable, but more immediate are, again, the streets. The views,
sunlight, air, and space for strolling they provide are, for some
neighborhoods, the only place these can be enjoyed. According to Alan
Jacobs, former director of the city's planning department, the care
people give to their houses and front yards attests to their care for
the streets and the city.2
4
Caring for the city has manifested itself in many ways. For exam-
ple, residents struggled for some fifty years to save and restore the
Palace of Fine Arts.51 Deep-felt concern for the quality of urban life
and respect for the city's heritage is also testified to by things like
neighborhood sponsored downzoning, an anti-freeway movement, opposition
to BART, an increased interest in preservation, and, important to this
study, the opposition to skyscrapers and their effects on the city's
cherished skyline.
Skyscrapers have replaced the hills, views, streets, and fine-grain-
ed neighborhoods as the dominant element in the cityscape, and as such
have been the focus of heated, citywide debates over who the city is for
and the kind of place it should be. The debates, likely the most divi-95
sive of their kind in recent U.S. history, had sides roughly drawn
between corporate interests (and the politicians that catered to them)
and almost everyone else.
The corporate elite of the city were, and presumably continue to
be, interested in seeing San Francisco maintain its position as the cul-
tural and financial center of the Bay area and seeing it establish it-
self as a gateway to Asian markets. This last goal was apparently
clinched by 1970 when a report by the Wells Fargo Bank claimed that the
"most important stimulus to San Francisco's economic base has been in-
creasing involvement in this century in Asian geopolitics." Success in
this respect was confirmed by increased volumes of exports moving through
city customs between 1964 and 1968: a 35 percent increase to the Philip-
pines, 61 percent to Japan, 80 percent to Australia, 171 percent to
Thailand, and 300 percent to the Republic of Korea. Significantly,
the same report boasts that between 1965 and 1968 the value of skyscraper
construction in the city hit $256 million, three times that for all of
the 1950s. Most was attributable to the city's largest landowners and
taxpayers; for example, the Bank of America, Transamerica, The Wells
Fargo Bank, and Bechtel. The development they promoted helped central-
ize banking, insurance, and commercial activities downtown.596
ref. 5, p. 16
An important component to all this was BART, dubbed at the time
"the largest single act of urban design currently underway in the United
States." Sold to the public as an anti-smog, anti-traffic alternative
to the automobile, its most important attribute was the ability to get
workers and shoppers to the central business district and its skyscrap-
ers. In short, BART was to be good for business. It would invigorate
downtown activity, thus bringing about higher land use and increased
densities, non-residential employment, and property valuations. Ac-
cording to a former San Francisco mayor's son, the city was to become
5
another Manhattan.
RECENT HEIGHT CONTROLS
IN SAN FRANCISCO...........
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The fear that the city would be "Nanhattanized" was critical to
raising opposition to skyscrapers and, secondarily, to BART. Too, it
was an important stimulus for development control measures enacted in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, large-scale develop-
ment increasingly met with public opposition. For example, in 1968
there was public outcry over a development that would have ruined views
to and from Coit Tower. By that time the impacts of such development
were becoming well-known: shadows, widened streets, increased traffic,
loss of historic landmarks, and destroyed views were unfortunately all
DOWNTOWN ZONING PLAN......
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plausible. People were also becoming increasingly sensitive to the
destruction of the city's Victorians and the "plastic" apartments put
up in their places.23 In sum, there was a growing concern for the social
and physical excesses of large,-scale development, for conservation of the
city's heritage, for the effects of rapid growth, and for the form of
the city.
In the 1960s, maintaining the physical attractiveness of the city
was an ad hoc affair, primarily because there was no citywide plan
against which to check development.2 3  In response to this shortcoming,
the city implemented three development control measures aimed at bal-
ancing public and private interests: the downtown zoning plan, the urban
design plan, and a height and bulk ordinance. The first was not city-
wide but the other two were.
The downtown zoning plan was put in place in 1967. Among its pro-
visions were a reduction in prime office and commercial space, a re-
directing of such space towards transit stops and away from residential
and historic districts, height limitations in critical areas (some for
the first time), development bonuses for plazas and transit stop links,
and reduced development intensities through a lower allowable floor area
ratio--14:1 instead of 16:1.23 Unfortunately, bonuses could accrue to
URBAN DESIGN PLAN..........
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a ratio of 24:1. This was hardly in line with lower development inten-
sities and prompted Alan Jacobs to say that Manhattanization was still
possible. But in defense of the plan, he also noted its laudable goals:
downtown should be compact and transit-oriented; its retail continuity
should be retained where possible; parking should be kept away from its
center; and the number and size of downtown office buildings should be
reduced.2 3
Although an important first step, the downtown zoning plan did not
address citywide urban design issues. To better grasp these, the city
planning department embarked on an urban design plan in 1968. They began
by commissioning eight preliminary reports and three special studies on
topics like street livability and urban design principles. Compiled
between December 1968 and October 1970, the reports and studies had the
dual purpose of, first, informing citizens and decision-makers and,
second, encouraging interest and support.23 They succeeded, but equal-
ly effective were the skyscraper controversies raging in the city. For
example, the Transamerica Building and a waterfront highrise proposal by
U.S. Steel both helped raise the public's consciousness and anger.
In 1971, three years after the urban design study was begun, a
plan was passed with overwhelming public support. Worth noting is the
buildings
hill
000
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The relationship of a building's size
and shape to its visibility in the city-
scape, to important natural features
and to existing development deter-
mines whether it will have a pleasing
or a disruptive effect on the image
and character of the city.
fig. 52: principle from
San Francisco 's urban
design plan
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competition it had from a public referendum. Spearheaded by Alvin Dus-
kin, a dress manufacturer, the referendum would have set a blanket build-
ing height limit of seventy-two feet over the entire city. To its
credit, the urban design plan was seen as a moderate alternative to
Duskin's proposal, a proposal which frightened both planners and busi-
nessmen. Upon approval, the plan became a part of the city's master
plan.2 3
In brief, the urban design plan addressed design quality through
objectives, principles, and policies for four major areas of concern:
city pattern, conservation, major new development, and neighborhood en-
24
vironments. Also included were preliminary height and bulk limita-
tions. Bulk was important to control since wide buildings could block
views and could, depending on their context, be out of scale with built
and natural forms. The height limitations were expressed as ranges which
were to provide a starting point for establishing specific limitations,
these to be completed within six months. When complete, they would be-
come part of the city's zoning ordinance. The principles behind the
preliminary ranges were straightforward: tall slender buildings on top
of hills can emphasize natural land forms; selectively placed tall
buildings can aid orientation within the city; tall buildings should
HEIGHT AND BULK
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not block views and should be harmonious with the scale and character
of their contexts; and, in keeping with existing patterns of develop-
ment, buildings along the waterfront should be kept low.
24
The preliminary height limitations met these principles. There was
an overwhelming 40-foot limit throughout the city with taller buildings
allowed on selected hills and near activity centers (e.g., transit stops).
Lower buildings were designated at the base of hills and in valleys with,
however, one exception--downtown. An unlimited height was allowed there,
supposedly to permit tall buildings to cluster and form a man-made hill.
2 3
Some cities deal with height and bulk on a discretionary basis in
order to have flexibility in responding to special conditions and to
encourage more desirable outcomes. But in San Francisco, such open-
endedness would have left the possibility for higher and more intense
development, an end to be avoided since it would lead to another con-
frontation. Accordingly, the interim height and bulk ranges were to
be reviewed publicly so that specific limitations could be set.
2 3
Public response to the preliminary limits revealed a certain amount
of discontent. For one, people were shocked to discover that these
were the first such controls for many areas of the city. Additionally,
there was a sense that the limits were too lenient--the sentiment for
stricter controls was surprisingly widespread. For instance, residents
of Russian Hill (where towers had been allowed under the urban design
plan) became dissatisfied when they more fully understood the conse-
quences of towers in their neighborhood. As a result, they demanded
a 40-foot limit for the district. There was little testimony favoring
height increases, except in a couple of instances near transit stops and
from a few individual property owners. Downtown interests were primarily
concerned that the planning department valued aesthetics much more than
economics and that the department had too much discretionary power.
Knowing that the height limits would be fixed helped in this last
23
respect.
As enacted, the height and bulk ordinance was molded to fit public
desires, with a total of twenty-seven height districts designated.2 3
In general, the limits were scaled down from those proposed in the urban
design plan. The most notable change from the plan's original princi-
ples was elimination of towers for visual emphasis of hills. 23
INVESTIGATING THE
IMPACTS..........Still, ardent skyscraper opponents felt immense frustration over
the urban design plan and the height and bulk ordinance. They argued
102 that the regulations catered to business interests that were bent on
destroying the city as it was. Their position on the subject is con-
tained in The Ultimate Highrise, a collection of articles and research
findings aimed at building a strong, anti-skyscraper constituency.
Another set of research findings comes from a group formed in 1943,
the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR). Ac-
cording to the opponents' own description, SPUR is a moderate, private-
ly financed citizens group usually sensitive to development issues in
the city. They purportedly take a citywide view of design, land use,
and environmental planning issues.5  In the interest of pinning down
tall building effects, they organized and published a study, the Impact
of Intensive High Rise Development on San Francisco. It covers a di-
verse range of topics and is structured around five scenarios. Scenario
#1 is a status quo representation of the city in 1974. The other four
represent forms the city might take by the year 1990, and vary by the
amount of growth (high versus low) and height of development (existing
limits or a more restrictive 160-foot limit). More specifically:
Scenario #2: postulates 10 million square feet of new office
space, 4,600 new hotel rooms, all built under the existing (1974) height
limitations.
Scenario #3: postulates 30 million square feet of new office103
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space, 6,600 new hotel rooms, all built under the existing (1974)
height limitations.
Scenario #4: postulates 10 million square feet of new office
space, 4,600 new hotel rooms, all built under a new height limitation
of 160 feet.
Scenario #5: postulates 30 million square feet of new office
space, 6,600 new hotel rooms, all built under a new height limitation
of 160 feet. 3 6
Following, then, is a summary of the findings and arguments of the
aforementioned sources. Together, they surfaced four major areas of
concern: safety, quality of life, aesthetics, and economics.
Comments on skyscraper safety issues were about fire and earth-
quakes. These have special significance to San Franciscans because of
the Fire of 1906 and the city's location in an earthquake zone.
Highrise opponent Michael J. Cussen, in The Ultimate Highrise,
claimed that new skyscrap2rs are miore dangerous than old ones, mainly
because of the plastics used for interior furnishings and finishes;
that the fire department ladders are too short, making many fires in-
accessible to firefighters; that fireproofing is inadequate; and that
vertical shafts within tall buildings allow smoke and heat to move
easily throughout. He alleged that it was only a matter of time before
a disastrous fire struck. SPUR dealt indirectly with the threat of fire
by addressing the cost of fire fighting. Contrary to what opponents
argued, SPUR noted that national and local trends indicated a decrease
in the frequency of fires in highrise areas; that new codes compelled
better construction for such buildings; and that over the years, San
Francisco would become safer. The reason for this was that newer, fire-
resistive construction would supposedly replace older, fire-prone
structures.36
Living in San Francisco instills one with respect for earthquakes.
Skyscraper opponents are quick to point out that it was not until 1947
that the city required earthquake resistant design for buildings and
that in 1969, five buildings built to these standards collapsed in
Caracas, Venezuela. Investigators from the San Francisco Bay Guardian
dug into old records and came up with a long list of buildings which did
not meet these standards, but they found local officials reluctant to
condemn them since doing so would take them off of the city's tax rolls.
The SPUR study only mentioned earthquakes in passing, remarking that
human life and material damage are the two things to be most concerned
36
with.106
QUALITY OF LIFE
environmental impacts.....
107
Quality of life issues in San Francisco were of great concern, es-
pecially to the SPUR researchers. It is important to note that such
issues, for the most part, were not significant in the earlier debates
in Chicago, Boston, and Washington. They became more so during the in-
tervening years as certain issues--like public health--took a somewhat
lower profile. In addition, the breadth of skyscraper impacts grew and
came to be better understood. Included among these are environmental
impacts (wind, noise, and air quality) and social behavior impacts (use
of open space and livability).
A frequent complaint of tall buildings is the wind conditions they
effect at street level, conditions which are uncomfortable and can be
dangerous. Through mathematical models, the SPUR researchers tested the
effects of buildings likely to be built under each scenario. The find-
ings show that buildings can either provide shelter from the wind or
make conditions worse; that the severity of winds at the base of tall
buildings depends on the dimensions and placement of buildings around
them; and that taller buildings produce worse wind conditions than
shorter ones, but that 160-foot buildings (i.e., scenarios #4 and #5)
are still tall enough to induce severe winds.
3 6
The SPUR researchers were also concerned with noise. They isolated
two kinds linked to urban development: that generated by increased
motor vehicle traffic and that generated by increased construction.
Traffic noise intensity, duration, and size of area affected all grew
with increased development. The most important variable was not the
height of a building but the amount of office space it accommodated.
Not surprisingly, they found that traffic noise can disturb sleep, inter-
fere with conversations, and, if excessive, impair hearing. As for con-
truction noise, the form of new development was important. Taller de-
velopment (like that in scenarios #2 and #3) generates such noise for a
longer period, whereas lower, more spread-out development (like that in
scenarios #4 and #5) distributes the noise over a greater area. Except
for the busiest streets, construction noise was found worse than traffic
noise and, like traffic noise, could lead to hearing impairment and
speech interference. It does not disturb sleep as much as it is general-
36
ly limited to the daytime.
Researchers organized by the San Francisco Bay Guardian found that
skyscrapers cause vast amounts of air pollution which, when linked with
water pollution, would cost the city $1billion to clean up (no time
limit given). They did not pinpoint the sources but blamed a good por-
tion of it on commuter (i.e., non-resident) congestion and on the long-108
social behavior
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term effects of BART. They said the latter would make air quality worse
because the system's capacity was limited and it would stimulate sky-
scraper construction. Together these implied a dramatic increase in
congestion.5 The SPUR researchers looked at air quality at a more local
level--that is, what happens to it around buildings themselves. They
found more sources of air pollution (i.e., more congestion) with scenar-
ios #2 and #3, the taller, denser development forms. This meant higher
carbon monoxide levels in these cases, a particularly harmful situation
under stagnant air conditions. They found, however, that gentle wind
conditions flushed air pollutants more effectively from around tall
buildings than from around low ones. Finally, they expected levels of
pollution to decrease as more automobiles became equipped with emission
control devices. 3
6
As urban areas become built up, the open spaces afforded become in-
creasingly valuable. With this in mind, the effects of skyscrapers on
open space use was investigated by the SPUR researchers. They were in-
terested in four determinations: first, whether tall buildings affect
the areas served by open spaces; second, whether the use levels of such
spaces were related to their visibility; third, the user's perceptions
of highrise impacts (e.g., wind and shadows) on open space character;
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and fourth, the impact of the various scenarios on the city's open spaces.
Among the things they did was map use patterns and service areas for six
parks and two plazas. Regarding their questions: use areas were affected
in that fewer people "behind" highrises used the open spaces; people who
cannot see such spaces from home or office use them less often; highrise
impacts on open space affect the very amenities users are seeking, for
example, sunlight; and scenarios #2 and #3 (the taller, denser scenarios)
would be most detrimental to open spaces since they created the highest
demand within the most limited area and, by virtue of their height, pro-
duced the most negative impacts.
The SPUR researchers also investigated the relative livability of
highrise and lowrise residential blocks (a highrise block was a mixture
of high and low residential buildings while a lowrise block had only
low). They were interested in the continuity between individual dwelling
units and the rest of the block (i.e., the residents' sense of territory)
and in the tensions between neighboring behavior and personal privacy.
It was their hypothesis that tension and continuity were affected by
highrises in residential areas in these ways: they increase the densi-
ties of people and motor vehicles; they produce dramatic physical changes
in terms of size, design, and symbolism; they close down views andi11
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openness; they overlook theirlower neighbors; and their residents are
often demographically distinct.36 They found that one-third to one-half
as many outdoor activities occurred on highrise blocks even though two
to four times as many people lived on them; that lowrise blocks had
three times as many conversation groups and people engaged in mainten-
ance tasks, two times as many residents relaxing, and two times as many
children playing outdoors; and that there was a discernable increase in
pedestrian and vehicular traffic on highrise blocks (resulting in streets
less likely to be used for activities other than driving).36 In sum,
they found highrise blocks less livable.
Debates on aesthetic issues were unexpectedly scarce in The Ultimate
Highrise. What was mentioned was better covered in the SPUR study,
which investigated views and citizens' impressions of the city.
Views were addressed by looking at blockage of existing and crea-
tion of new view opportunities by tall buildings, and by looking at who
benefitted and lost under a variety of conditions. Specifically, the
researchers analyzed nineteen building heights between 80 and 550 feet
above sea level. The results: existing views accrued to those residing
in the upper floors of downtown highrises and those on Nob Hill; scenar-
io #3 (the high growth, taller scenario) obstructed more existing and
city impressions...,,....
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provided more new view opportunities than the others; the greatest number
of new view opportunities under all scenarios went to downtown office
workers and visitors to the city (i.e., an abundance of non-residents)
while the greatest losses were suffered by those living on Nob Hill and
those in the lower floors of buildings downtown. The most direct rela-
tionship which emerged was that the higher new construction is, the
greater the loss of existing view opportunities.
3 6
The researchers surveyed workers and residents for their impressions
of the city's skyscrapers to find, first, what they were and, second, how
they jibed with the scenarios. Aesthetics were found to be the most im-
portant evaluator of citywide quality, and the taller scenarios, #2 and
#3, were found frequently at odds with respondents' aesthetic sensibili-
ties. Their most frequent complaint about the city's highrises was a
"loss of unique San Francisco character," and the preferred vantage point
for viewing highrises was from far away. At the district level, aesthetics
were the main criteria for judging neighborhood quality (eighty-four per-
ent) and commercial district quality (seventy-five percent). Most res-
pondents (sixty-two percent) said they would avoid living in areas with
highrises. It was also found that what passed for a highrise was not
tall by today's standards: the median definition height was 14.7
ref. 38, p. 574
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stories. Included in the survey were open-ended questions to elicit
impressions of skyscrapers. On the positive side were statements like:
feeling of progress in the finest city in the world,
sense of being within a city,
multiply access to view, sun,
magnificent profile of towering high-rise buildings,
rather than small, low flat old buildings that remind me
of the past and old days.
And on the negative side were statements like:
I remember the very beautiful view I used to have,
shut out light and air,
bring more traffic,
bleagh--let New York have them,
money talks, that's all there is to it,
launch Transamerica pyramid into orbit and plant a giant
Redwood tree in its place
The economic issues which surfaced were quite different from those
at the turn of the century. There was not, for example, any debate on
the economic height of buildings nor much on tall buildings' effects on
property values. To believe these subjects were unimportant is mislead-
ing; their lack of visibility is a result of the sources of information
and the fact that the issues are subtlely buried within others. At any
rate, the economic issues discussed included employment and municipal
costs and revenues.
A former mayor of the city, Joseph Alioto, said "we need tall
buildings because they give us jobs and taxes. Like others, he assumed
High-Rise Descriptors - Positive
a sign of the big city
necessary to life of a big city in restricted area
feeling of progress in finest city in the world
I like them; it gives the city a majestic look.
High-rise is a part of the urban scene; part and parcel of city's life.
Gives me the feeling of living in a City.
High buildings . . . is a city, not a town.
Without downtown highrises there would be no downtown (other than a Mil-
pitas main street).
Looks good in downtown area; high-rise should be restricted to downtown
area.
Don't mind them in downtown area. They are economical and useful there
providing they are not giants.
riches of this country
increasing importance of San Francisco in world finance and trade
San Francisco becoming headquarters city
teeming pulse of San Francisco financial center (2)(1)
center of commercial activity (2)
San Francisco financial center of West (3)
West Coast Wall St.
distinction of San Francisco from other cities
I like the big buildings; gives me a feeling of being in N. Y.
catching up to New York
big city look
sense of being within a city
Makes me feel I am in a metropolitan area.
how skyline and general appearance of San Francisco has changed in past
20 years
multiply access to view, sun
getting views for occupants
They stabilize the wind.
add to the overall beauty of the entire city
enjoy a few of the new buildings
I happen to like high rise buildings.
I like the new buildings with plazas and some greenery.
Frequency of mention@.
fig. 58, 59: examples of impressionistic responses to
San Francisco's skyscrapers, the SPUR study
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no view left
destroys view
obscures views
obstructs view (10)
views blocked (22)
views closed
cut off view (8)
cut off vistas
spoils view (3)
taking view away (3)
encroach on many people's view (2)
close off air and view
block scenery
obliterates scenic view
cannot see the Bay (3)
unpleasant to look at (32)
I remember the very beautiful view I used to have.
high-rise very unpleasant to look at and destroy what might otherwise be
a pleasant view
less sunlight
shut out light and air
Sun can't get to streets. (2)
shuts out sun (3)
loss of sunshine
blocks sunshine
cut off sunshine (3)
cut out sunshine (2)
blocking out sunshine (9)
cut off light (3)
block out sky
never sunny
obstruct light
envelope smaller buildings
shadow other buildings
Makes it dark in daytime.
Living space on the dark side would be like a grave.
full of corridors of wind
cause downdrafts
make wind tunnels (5)
(Dislike viewing high-rises on) windy, shady
cold and windy, any view is foul.
side (because) so goddamn
High-R ise Descriptors - Negative
skyscrapers would bring employment to the city. Greggar Sletteland,
writing for The Ultimate Highrise, asserts that such logic is akin to
saying highways provide transportation--the cause and effect relation-
ship is not all that clear.5
Sletteland complains that skyscraper advocates have a short-sighted
view of employment generated by skyscrapers: they fail to assess honest-
ly who gets the jobs and the kinds of jobs they are. Advocates in San
Francisco asserted that skyscrapers provided numerous support jobs like
bellboys, retail clerks, and restaurant employment, as well as technical
and professional jobs. Sletteland disagrees, pointing out, first, that
service jobs are dead-end and poor substitutes for the secure blue collar
jobs lost when the skyscrapers came, and, second, that most of the in-
crease in service jobs comes from tourism and health care. He alleges
that only twenty-five percent result directly from the business sector
and, moreover, that skyscrapers will destroy the reasons tourists come
to the city. He points to a noticeable decline in tourism during 1969
and 1970 and remarks that, should the trend continue, a lot of low-
skilled jobs would be lost.5
Sletteland also looks at the relative strength of employment sec-
tors. He cites that during the 1960s the total San Francisco labor116
force moved up 60,400 with white collar jobs accounting for nearly
seventy-four percent of the increase. Furthermore, a disproportionate
number of those jobs went to people commuting to the city, while few
went to the city's underemployed. He claims that such dramatic jumps
in white collar jobs have a negative impact on blue collar jobs: new
offices drive up property values and taxes thus forcing manufacturing
and trade industries out of the city. As evidence, he points to a de-
creasein blue collar jobs of some 14,000 during the 1960s, a decade of
uprecedented skyscraper construction in San Francisco. Further frustra-
ting this trend was urban redevelopment which was eliminating smaller,
5
more marginal businesses.
The findings of the SPUR study corroborated some of Sletteland's,
though their numbers were sometimes different. They agreed that the
1960s had brought a decrease in the city's manufacturing jobs (they
said 13,000) and an increase in central business district jobs. One
shocking statistic was that employment for the county (including the
CBD) had risen by some 60,000 while that for the CBD alone had risen
80,000, an indication of phenomenal growth in finance, insurance, real
estate, services, and government. However, the SPUR researchers took a
less calloused view of these changes. They agreed with Sletteland that117
highrises do not by themselves create jobs. But instead of blaming
highrises for altering employment opportunities, they were inclined to
say that changing employment opportunities effected increased highrise
construction. But they were quick to note that a simple one-to-one re-
lationship between the two did not exist. For example, for one five
year period (1969-1974), three times as much office space had been built
than the increase in office jobs called for. They explained the slack,
in part, through changing vacancy rates, changing standards for office
worker space, and demolition and underutilization of existing office
space.36 SPUR researchers also tracked the breakdown for office, hotel,
and construction employment under each scenario. Not surprisingly, each
was higher under the high-growth scenarios, #3 and #5.36
Who works downtown? Though an oversimplification, the SPUR re-
searchers found that the prototypical office worker in 1974 was a thirty-
five year old white male, married, and without children. He lived out-
side of San Francisco and commuted to work via public transit to a
$14,000 per year professional or technical job. The prototypical hotel
worker in 1974 was a thirty-six year old white male, married, and without
children. He lived within San Francisco and commuted to work via MUNI
to a $7,100 per year service job. SPUR researchers said the city's118
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expanding office sector reflected demographic trends. Though not indi-
cated by the prototypes above, the trends were towards a younger popula-
tion, less likely to marry, and with fewer children for those that do. 3 6
The effect on city coffers is indicative of whether skyscrapers are
a benefit to a city--is there a net gain or loss when costs and revenues
are tallied? The answer to this question varied for The Ultimate High-
rise and the SPUR studies. The former found that skyscrapers were an
economic liability for San Francisco. Their research showed that the
downtown highrise district cost the city $5 million more in 1970 than it
produced in revenues; that the district's proportion of the city's pro-
perty tax revenues had dropped by sixteen percent compared to what it
had been before the skyscraper boom of the 1960s; and that transportation
costs to service the skyscraper district would total some $5 billion
5
over the next ten years.
One opponent, Michael Metcalf, claimed that those who argue that
highrises widen the tax base are misled (or lying) if one considers
that skyscrapers simply reaccommodate office workers already in the city.
He claims, too, that the property tax paid per occupant is lower for
skyscrapers. As an example, he notes that the Bank of America building
paid taxes equal to $638.70 per occupant but replaced a number of lower
buildings which, when totaled together, paid $660.57 per occupant. He
underplayed the fact that the bank building's occupancy level of 5,000--
and growing--had replaced 425 workers. Metcalf also noted that the
CBD's portion of the tax base had decreased over the years.5
Greggar Sletteland brought up the issue of the costs of increasing
density, noting that former New York Mayor John Lindsay claimed that
high density "is responsible for inevitably higher costs for every con-
ceivable service." Such was born out by statistics presented which in-
dicated that per capita expenses for public expenses increased as popu-
lation and density increased. For example, Sletteland points out that
the highrise district took 22.9 percent of the fire Department's budget
but only occupied 3.4 percent of the city's developable land. He did
not remark that the central business district accounted for 20.8 percent
of the city's assessed value. 5
The SPUR study, on the other hand, found fiscal benefits to all
four scenarios. They compared the scenarios by focusing on three
questions. First, what would be the net effect of costs and revenues?
If the net was negative, the new revenue sources would have to be found.
Second, even if revenues exceeded costs, would the level of development
exceed existing municipal service capacities? If it did, then infra-120
structure improvements would have to be financed, possibly offsetting
otherwise beneficial gains. Third, would height limits for new office
and hotel construction help avoid reaching these capacities? In other
words, are height controls fiscally effective.36 Regarding the first
question, revenues exceeded costs for each scenario, but the surplus
was greater for #3 and #5, the high-growth scenarios. As for the second
question, no scenario exceeded existing municipal service capacities.
And as for the third question, slightly greater fiscal benefits accrued
to the taller developments when judged against the comparable lower ones.
This was because taller development resulted in less demolition of exist-
ing tax-producing properties and had higher construction costs, thus in-
creasing the property taxes that could be assessed against it.
36
Looking at municipal costs, SPUR research did not substantiate the
soaring costs claimed in The Ultimate Highrise. In fact, increases were
rather low. One reason was because many contemporary hotels and offices
provide in-house police and security, thus relieving the city of those
responsibilities. SPUR also established that police costs did not in-
crease with higher buildings, a claim made by some skyscraper opponents.
Fire protection costs were found to be fairly stable since modern archi-
tectural and building code standards compelled generally fire-resistant121
construction. Sewer cost impacts were minimal under all scenarios, a
point explained in part by a capital improvements program then in the
process of upgrading the existing system. Water service costs were also
largely unaffected--from the city's fiscal view--because the water de-
partment is an independent agency which collects its own user fees.
Finally, school costs were slightly higher for #3 and #5, the high-
growth scenarios.5
EPILOGUE The more pertinent urban design implications and recommendations
suggested by SPUR are worth mentioning. For one, the lower height
scenarios were found to affect more than twice the area of the comparable
taller scenarios (i.e., comparing #2 to #4 and #3 to #5). However, the
lower ones would not significantly harm historic districts whereas the
taller ones would harm them visually. The economic benefits from all of
them were comparable (and positive), but the lower ones had fewer nega-
tive environmental impacts--for example, sun, wind, and open space use.
Also, the SPUR researchers were critical of the city's regulations which
they alleged did not consider the pedestrian environment as well as they
might have. The study recommended that an overall downtown open space
122 and pedestrian walkway system be designed which all subsequent development
ref. 50, p. 44
ref. 50, p. 44
would have to adhere to.3 6
Where has all the debate and research on San Francisco skyscrapers
led? Apparently, years of controversy, untold costs for studies, and
one of the most admired urban design plans of recent times have done
little to dim the process of Manhattanization. This was attested to by
Sally Woodridge, who said in 1980 that "nearly ten years of unchecked
development had confirmed environmentalists' worst fears." In 1979,
because of this continued development, another referendum to limit the
height of buildings was put up for public vote. It proposed lowering
the present 700-foot limit downtown to 260 feet and giving bonuses for
preservation of registered historic landmarks and provision of housing.
It addressed many of the problems mentioned before: air, water, and
noise pollution; traffic and parking problems; demands on public services;
and creation of a "dark, windy, and uninviting downtown." Like Alvin
Duskin's initiation from the early 1970s, it failed to pass.
fig. 60: Coit Tower
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Since the late 1950s, there has been increased interest in modify-
ing Washington's 1910 building height law, even though many people feel
that doing so would infringe upon the integrity of L'Enfant's plan. Major
infringements to date, however, have not come from buildings exceeding
the 1910 limits; except for a few exemptions, none of them extreme, archi-
tectural development has kept to the letter of the law.
Instead, the threats have come from intrusions into the plan, archi-
tectural and otherwise. To understand their nature one must understand
the nature of the plan. In brief, it is an axial scheme with wide avenues
radiating from and linking significant buildings and monuments; the in-
trusions have interrupted the views down these avenues.
For example, Pennsylvania Avenue is blocked to the southeast by the
Library of Congress; nearly all streets southeast and southwest of the
Capitol -- whether axial or otherwise -- are blocked by elevated free-
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ways, or railroad tracks, or end up in military compounds; and the
Robert F. Kennedy Stadium blocks East Capitol Street which was originally
conceived with a direct visual connection to the Capitol. Other intru-
sions have come from roads and highways indiscriminately overlaid upon
parts of the original street network. Much of this occurred in the 1940s
as automobiles -- and the suburbs -- became increasingly popular and as
fears of enemy attack brought decisions to disperse government functions
to areas outside of the city. The redirecting of traffic required to do
this resulted in overstressing, vacationing, and widening of some exist-
ing streets.
Though powerful, L'Enfant's plan cannot take such insensitivities
forever. Nonetheless, there has still been a recurring desire for taller
buildings. Being for or against raising the 1910 limits usually depends
on whether one takes a local or national view of the problem. Before
going into detail, it should be pointed out that this raises an important
contradiction: Is it possible for a national capital to be both a success-
ful capital and a successful city, or do the respective needs conflict
too strongly? In Washington, conflict between them appears to be strong.
Though information in this study is insufficient, one conjecture is that
monumental city designs -- like Washington's -- are more apt to raise such126
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conflicts, especially if the designs are rigidly adhered to.
This point aside, supporters of the local view in Washington have had
an overriding concern for the local economy, feeling that relaxing
height limitations would help invigorate it. In the early 1970s, Mayor
Walter Washington, an advocate for this view, claimed that raising the
limits would be "a positive approach to modern times and growing costs."
Others agreed, including the City Council, the Zoning Commission, and a
number of local architects and planners.9 On the other hand are those
who assert that the Capital's significance extends beyond its boundaries.
Their view is that increasing the limits would harm the city's symbolic
skyline, a loss of some consequence to the country. Among those with
this view in the early 1970s were the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts and
the National Capital Planning Commission. The Fine Arts Commission has
an advisory role over height, color, appearance, and texture of building
exteriors in the federal core area.9 The National Capital Planning Com-
mission is responsible for reviewing changes to the city's comprehensive
plan.
Though generally opposed to raising the limits, the Planning Commis-
sion did authorize, in 1965, a study by architect Chloethial Woodard Smith,
a study to see how the city's skyline might be improved. Her proposal was
to place high-rises at selected points within the city. This, she said,
would improve the skyline by relieving it of its flatness, by helping
frame views of monuments and by providing "gateways" at the city's
major entrances.1 The study, which was widely distributed, met with
immediate opposition and proclamations of the city's beauty. It sud-
denly became very fashionable to refer to the cityscape as serene and
harmonious whereas boring and monotonous had been common adjectives
before. Among the many opposed to her study was Chicago architect
Harry Weese who found it inane to arbitrarily organize skyline features
on purely aesthetic ground.1 He did not comment that this same motivation
-- skyline aesthetics -- drove the enactment of the 1910 limits and
that it was essentially as arbitrary as Smith's suggestions, maybe even
more so. Regardless, the Fine Arts Commission found the proposal similarly
offensive, proclaiming: "... we happen to believe in the L'Enfant Plan.
It is the finest example of urban planning in the Western Hemisphere and
ref. 1, p.3 2  we intend to keep it that way."
Shortly following Smith's study, despite the negative reactions,
were a number of bills proposing to raise the Capital's height limit.
The bills were substantively the same except with regards to whether
9128 230 feet or 630 feet should be the new limit. The bills' most interest-
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ing aspects were the purposes that relaxing the height limitations would
satisfy. With a couple of exceptions, they were
To authorize realistic, economic, and modern building heights
and bulk in the District of Columbia, to provide new housing
and employment opportunities for all, to expand the tax base,
to stimulate and assist efforts to break the poverty cycle
and strengthen the economy...
These purposes sum up many of the arguments for raising the height
limits, but it was not self-evident that doing so would help achieve them.
As a topic of public interest, there were at least two sides to the
issue. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the various views found their
way into the Washington press and other publications.
Press coverage of Washington's height limits dealt with quality of
life, aesthetics, and economics. The first received scant attention
whereas the other two were the subjects of considerable concern, this
because of the special demands placed on the Capital.
In the press, the problems of light and air and congestion had more
to do with comfort than with health and safety as in the earlier cases.
Paul Tischler commented that congestion and tall buildings go hand in
hand to make automobile travel and parking difficult, and that the loss
of light and air makes areas around tall buildings uncomfortable and un-
AESTHETICS...............
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desirable. Architect Arthur Cotton Moore disagreed that the city would
become overly congested if the height limits were relaxed. He pointed
out that the Capital, unlike Manhattan, was neither a financial center,
a business center, a port, nor on a narrow strip of land.9
The symbolic importance of structures like the Capitol Building and
the White House was a pertinent argument for maintaining the Capital's
low profile. Numerous references in the press -- too many to mention --
recognized this. This, however, did not keep some authors from criticizing
those who adhered to this stance too adamantly. Arthur Cotton Moore
asserted that maintaining lower limits to allow monuments to dominate
the city was a misguided action: by virtue of the city's topography,
the 1910 law already allowed some buildings to stand taller than some of
the monuments they were to protect. Jim Seymour agreed and said fur-
ther that carefully placed skyscrapers would not impact monuments nega-
tively. And Wolf von Eckardt, a champion of civic beauty, admitted that
symbolic prerogative! as important as they are,might have to be tempered
given the realities of development. There was another twist to the
issue of symbolism: What do skyscapers dotting the Capital's skyline
tell about the ethos of the city and the nation? One of the more
surprising comments on this came from Nathaniel Owings of Skidmore
ref. 9, p. 172
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Owings and Merrill. He was opposed to tall buildings in the city, arguing
that they represented a "mono-culture ... a mechanistic, scientific-
oriented society." Carter Brown, speaking for the Fine Arts Commis-
sion, claimed that skyscrapers symbolized economic greed, something
quite inappropriate for Washington.9
Groups arguing to maintain the skyline often did so on the grounds
that the city's scale was at stake. For example, the Fine Arts Commis-
sion had, for this reason, voted against a bill to increase the height
limit. But advocates for taller buildings claimed that the argument
did not mesh with reality. James Bailey pointed out that 90 and 110-foot
tall buildings were hardly human-scaled -- all they succeeded in was
making the Capital "the world's highest low city, a weird distinction
comparable to that of being the tallest midget on earth." Jim Seymour,
arguing much the same, quoted the New Yorker magazine on the topic of
Washington's scale: "It's not even human-scale -- just a succession of
thirteen-story dumplings."
Variety was a subtlety of aesthetics mentioned often by those who
wanted taller buildings. Generally, they argued that the skyline was
monotonous. Arthur Cotton Moore claimed that the city's zoning and
height regulation resulted in a "short, fat, sexless" downton. Alan
ref. 36, p. 178
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Lockman, also an architect, said as much, noting in addition that
existing height limits and zoning compelled developers to use every
square foot of space available. The result was developments without
a trace of open-space amenity. He suggested that height limits be
flexible and floor area ratios constant. This would foster architectural
variety and urban open spaces without increasing density. And again
from Jim Seymour quoting the New Yorker: "The District's commercial
buildings all look like ice cubes emptied out of the same tray."
Debates in Washington about economic issues focused on development
costs and the flow of capital. Increased costs to developers were
crucial to the first; where development occurred and why was crucial
to the second.
Development has become increasingly complex over the last century.
More people, especially in larger cities, have an interest in (and
some control over) development. For instance, city government, neigh-
borhood and citizen's groups, financial institutions, and state and local
governments are all likely to have some input. Arthur Cotton Moore re-
marked that this has added to development costs in ways that may improve
a building's design but not necessarily its economic return -- in fact,
they usually make it worse. Among the costs he identifies are fees for
architectural presentations to sell the project to the various actors , fees
to attorneys to iron out legal roadblocks, and particularly on larger
projects, fees to various consultants for reports and guarantees demanded
by government. It was his contention that the 1910 height limitations
were out of sync with these new demands and that architects and developers
had to be allowed more flexibility in order to develop buildings with
reasonable returns. Raising the height limits, he said, would help. 9
Others disagreed. Paul Tischler asserted that tall buildings do
not benefit from economies of scale: rather, increased construction
costs bring a slight unit area increase as buildings get taller. He
added, though, that savings on skyscraper operating costs might make up
for this. Jim Seymour attacked the popular assertion that higher property
values necessitate taller buildings. He claimed that a would-be developer
should run a financial set-up for a piece of property on the market,
basing his calculations on the highest and best use, his expected return
on investment, and his anticipated site improvement costs. Thus, a
fair market value for the property could be determined which could then
be presented to the seller. If the seller finds the price too low (in
other words, if the seller is speculating on the property) then the
developer should just move on.9 Of course, Seymour's suggestion is133
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simplistic; in a free-market economy a willing buyer can likely be
found at or near the asking price anyway.
A number of writers complained that the city's height limits gave
the suburbs an unfair advantage in attracting investment capital, or,
conversely, that they scared it away from the city. The Washington Post,
in an editorial in March 1969, remarked that employment centers were
shifting to the suburbs because of the greater building heights allowed
there. John Williams, writing in the Post a couple of years later, said
that relaxing the limits would reverse this trend and help rejuvenate
the inner city.9 Some blame for this trend was levelled against the
federal government. Paul Thiry noted the government's large demand for
office space and then criticized its practice of signing lease and lease-
purchase agreements for office space in the suburbs. By doing so, it
was perpetuating the trend of suburban growth at the expense of the city's
welfare. Wolf von Eckhardt (whose viewpoint on building heights changes
often) identified the same problem. He argued that raising the limit
was unnecessary and that the federal government should take the lead
by moving its offices back to the city. In time, he said, others would
follow. He contended that the limits did not need relaxing because
of the unrealized potentialof the present zoning envelope. He said that if
EPILOGUE .................
135
it was fully realized, downtown employment would go from 1,000 to 13,000
9
with a commensurate increase in tax assessments.
Eugene Meyer held that some people criticized those who wanted the
1910 law relaxed on the grounds that the latter, behind a masquerade of
downtown development, were really interested in changing the predominantly
black downtown into an employment and shopping district for white suburb-
anites. And, finally, Paul Tischler said that raising the height limits
would have a deleterious effect since taller buildings would reduce the
amount of land developed on (presumably because there was only so much
demand for space). This would mean fewer buildings built and, as a
consequence, a diminishing of newly constructed ground-floor retail
9
space.
The outcome of the ongoing debate in Washington has been the continued
application of the 1910 building height law. But as might be suspected,
this has not brought an end to the conflicts. A recent phone call to the
National Capital Planning Commission revealed that the same issues are
being discussed in the same ways they were before: architects claim the
skyline needs verticality to relieve it of its monotony, developers claim
narrower, taller buildings will bring higher rents, the Planning Commission
and others claim that federal monuments must dominate private buildings,
and city officials claim that higher buildings would help the city
fiscally.
This situation is unlikely to change in the near future even though
Washington was given home rule powers in the late 1970s. The reason is
that the structure of decisionmaking still puts all matters pertaining
to the comprehensive plan, including building heights, up for federal
review. Briefly, the comprehensive plan designates "federal elements"
and "local elements" with the respective levels of government responsible
for preparation of each. However, all changes to the comprehensive
plan proposed by local authorities are reviewed by the Planning Commission
and/or Congress to see that they do not conflict with federal needs. The
bottom line is that Congress still has the final say in setting and
changing Washington's building heights.
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CONCLUSIONS
At this point, a few concluding remarks are in order. Clearly,
each case presented is about much more than tall buildings: when ag-
gregated, they tell us something about generic problems faced in acts
of city building.
For one, the skyscraper debates indicate much about the values
people hold for cities and the settings they provide. It is apparent
that one set of values is about the economic objectives of groups and
individuals; objectives often at odds with each other. Equally impor-
tant are values about aesthetics, health and safety, and the quality of
life. Struggles to mold cities so that they support these needs were
often at the root of the debates. These values have been persistant,
but their relative importance has varied over time. For example, the
importance of health issues has subsided as public health and sanitary
conditions have improved; and the emergence of quality of life issues137
has come about because, first, these issues have become increasingly
problematic as skyscrapers have proliferated and, second, for a variety
of reasons--e.g., less concern about public health and greater concern
for the environment--people now have the "luxury" and ability to deal
with such matters. For much the same reasons, it is no longer simply
city fathers or those entrusted with protecting the beauty of Washington
who concern themselves with aesthetics.
The cases also show that skyscrapers were instrumental in bringing
to the fore strains between private gain and public well-being. As such,
they elicited some of this country's earliest development controls.
Setting and administering these placed additional responsibilities on
local government. For example, it was apparently a great challenge to
set height standards that were both equitable and legal. The court
cases and debates around such standards indicate that it was not always
clear that these challenges had been met.
Balancing divergent needs also meant having to be clear on the
effects of skyscrapers and development controls. This implied having
some understanding of how cities functioned, and, in this respect, sky-
scraper debates were a barometer of that understanding. The early de-
bates revealed an incomplete comprehension of things like office demand138
and supply and the effects development standards have on the flow of
investment capital. On the other hand, the recent debates indicated
that there is today a better understanding of these and other issues.
People now deal in more sophisticated ways with relationships between,
for example, employment, municipal finance, and social and behavioral
impacts. The upshot is that the skyscraper has forced people to improve
their models of urban relationships and, thus, their ability to make pre-
dictions.
Finally, a disconcerting observation. If it is true that skyscrap-
ers have presented occasions to be clearer about values, the balance
between public and private interests, and our understanding of urban re-
lationships, then why have the debates persisted? Plainly, one reason
is that the motivations for developing skyscapers--e.g., higher rents,
prestige, and headquartering activities--still exist. Thus the number
of skyscrapers continues to grow. Additionally, their prestige and rent
aspects, in particular, necessitate increasingly higher buildings; that
is, they perpetuate the trend of increasing heights. The dynamic of
these two trends implies, first, that the impacts of skyscrapers are
becoming more pronounced, and, second, that there is, as a consequence,
an ongoing process of rediscovering skyscraper impacts. Ideally, one139
would hope to find an equilibrium point which balanced private economic
gain and public well-being. However, with continued pressures to secure
the former and growing desires to protect the latter, it is unlikely
that this balance can be achieved for any great length of time. Until
it is, skyscraper debates will persist.
10
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